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Introduction
Unigov is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in Indianapolis and
Indiana history. In the often times hostile environment of Indiana politics it is nothing
short of a miracle that the leaders in the Republican Party were able to get the Unigov bill
approved and have it be as successful for the city as it has been. Unigov also created a
modern day political machine for the Republican Party of Indianapolis. The new city of
Indianapolis under the leadership of Republican Mayors Richard Lugar and William
Hudnut has earned national name recognition on the convention circuit and for hosting
amateur athletics events. Over time the growth attributed to Unigov has proven to be
unsustainable. Unigov has also been inefficient at solving many of the social problems
the city had when it was created.
Unigov and the initial growth of the city from its consolidation were dependent on
the suburban tax base that used to exist in the outer townships of Marion County. Unigov
has had the effect of pushing that tax base even further out from the central business
district. Many of the problems Indianapolis faces today were the same problems it faced
when Unigov expanded the city. This has had the effect of building a new city on old
problems. As the suburbs have expanded they now compete directly with Indianapolis for
jobs, entertainment, and cultural events. The goal of this paper is to better understand the
need for Unigov, how it fits into a national context, and how the city has fared over the
first twenty-two years since its enactment.
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Chapter 1 City Living Patterns Begin to Change
Origins of Urban Sprawl
The unplanned outward growth of a city has come to be known by the term urban
sprawl. It is one of the most complex problems for an American city. In the 1920s Robert
E. Park (1864–1944) and Ernest W. Burgess (1886–1966) at the University of Chicago
developed what are now commonly held theories on urban ecology which proposed that
cities were environments like those found in nature. Park and Burgess proposed the idea
that scarce urban resources, such as land, led to competition between groups and
ultimately to the division of the urban space into distinctive ecological niches or "natural
areas" in which people shared similar social characteristics because they were subject to
the same ecological pressures.1

Nina Brown. "CSISS Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925." CSISS
Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925. January 1, 2011. Accessed
December 14, 2014. http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/26.
1
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The Concentric Zone Theory

Five zones of concentric zone theory2

Their model, known as the concentric zone theory and first published in The
City (1925), predicted that cities would take the form of five concentric rings with areas
of social and physical deterioration concentrated near the city center and more prosperous
areas located near the city's edge. These outer areas would eventually become known as
the suburbs.3 The mass production of automobiles allowed working and middle class,
predominately white, Americans to move farther and farther away from their places of
work or the train depots that ran into the city, creating sprawl. Between 1920 and 1930,
automobile registration rose by more than 150 percent and the suburbs of the nation’s

"Concentric Zones." Crime and Place. Accessed December 15, 2014.
http://crimeandplaceashleypick.weebly.com/concentric-zones.html.
3
Nina Brown. "CSISS Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925." CSISS
Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925. January 1, 2011. Accessed
December 14, 2014. http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/26.
2
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ninety-six largest cities grew twice as fast as the core communities. The automobile made
it infinitely easier to commute in directions perpendicular to the trolley tracks and the
truck became a marvel of efficiency as it changed the way people lived and worked. With
the ease and cheapness of moving people in and out of the center city, workers fanned out
in the metropolis, while factories crowded near the rail heads.4
As the automobile suburbs began to emerge they had noticeable characteristics
such as lower population density and larger average lot sizes as compared to anything
previously seen in an American urban setting. Lot sizes increased from about three
thousand square feet to five thousand square feet. The idea of an American city with
densely populated urban centers of people, industries, stores, and offices had become a
nineteenth century phenomenon. In conjunction with cheap fuel and mass produced
vehicles, the urban expressways were another way of lowering the marginal
transportation costs and greatly stimulated further expansion from the central business
district. This appeal of low-density living over time and across regional, class, and ethnic
groups has been so powerful that some have even begun to think of it as inevitable. This
appeal was even stronger when one considers the financial incentive of detached home
living provided by the deduction of mortgage interest and real estate taxes from gross
income.5

Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 175,183-184.
5
Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 184-185, 188, 191.
4
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New subdivisions that developed after World War II shared common attributes,
including a peripheral location, low density, and the design of the neighborhoods based
on the idea that everyone would have an automobile. If suburban residents did not have a
vehicle, they would face a major handicap in accessing jobs and shopping facilities.
Another characteristic of these new suburban housing developments was their easy
financial availability. Due to mass-production techniques, government financing, higher
wages, and a low interest rate, it was much cheaper to buy new housing in the suburbs
than it was to reinvest in central city properties or to even rent at market prices.6
As the middle-class left the central city, the central city became more isolated
from middle-class society. These neighborhoods have become dominated by joblessness,
racial segregation and were further separated from the private economy. Children were
deprived of local successful role models and connections to opportunity inside or outside
the neighborhood. A society emerged with expectations and patterns of behavior that
contrasted strongly with middle-class norms. As poverty concentrated and social
disorganization increased, crime grew, and waves of middle-class flight, business
disinvestment, and property values surrounding the core continued to decline.7

Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 238-241.
7
Orfield, Myron. "Portland Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability." July 1,
1998, 4-7. Accessed February 13, 2015.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFA
QFjAHOAo&url=https://clfuture.org/sites/clfuture.org/files/pdfs/clf_publications/portland_metropolitics_
report.pdf&ei=lprdVISiF9jpoATmqoHQBA&usg=AFQj.
6
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Racial discrimination is another problem stemming from before the United States
emerged as an independent nation; this has led to an extremely limited amount of land for
black Americans in the city and the suburbs. The federal government created a direct
impact on the racial make-up of communities by allowing discrimination to become
institutionalized in the United States’ housing markets. This happened under the New
Deal when the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created to help struggling
families meet mortgage payments. This was done by offering low interest, long-term
mortgage loans. In doing this the HOLC developed a ratings system to evaluate the risk
associated with loans made to specific urban neighborhoods. These became known as
residential security maps. On these maps the highest risk areas were colored red and were
“red-lined;” even those with small black percentages were rated as “hazardous,” and
residents were denied loans. During the 1930s and 1940s, HOLC residential security
maps were widely used by private banks for their own loan practices.8
This had the effect of institutionalizing common discriminatory banking practices
and increased the difficulty for black Americans to own their home. Lack of home
ownership has forced black Americans to rent and the tenant will gain no equity. When
the apartment building fell into disrepair and lowered its own and neighboring property
value, the local schools suffered from the lower tax revenues. These practices created a

David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs: Third Edition a 2000 Census Update, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2003), 1,24.
8
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demoralizing effect on the communities they impacted and reinforced negative
stereotypes for communities who had never suffered from such discrimination.
The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act, that created the interstate freeway system,
has provided the opportunity for residents to live in suburbs even further away from the
center city. Indianapolis for instance, now has Interstate 465 that runs for approximately
fifty-two miles around the outer edge of Marion County. The original Indianapolis ring
road was Kessler Boulevard which was built in 1920 and had been designed to get people
to the east and west of Indianapolis. However, Kessler Boulevard only runs for a
combined length of twelve miles.9 The Interstate Highway system has made it possible
for people to commute to work from longer distances and created a fact that interurban
transportation (between cities) was better than intraurban transportation (within cities).10
This increased the distance a metropolitan statistical area now covers and has made it
nearly impossible for traditional forms of local government to control the problems
caused and exacerbated by urban sprawl.

Sharon Freeland. "HI Mailbag: Origin of the Name of Kessler Boulevard." Historic Indianapolis All
Things Indianapolis History RSS. December 31, 2013. Accessed December 14, 2014.
http://historicindianapolis.com/hi-mailbag-origin-of-the-naming-of-kessler-boulevard/.
10
Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 184-185, 188, 191.
9
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Interstate 465

Map of present day Indianapolis11

"Google Maps." Google Maps. Accessed December 15, 2014.
https://www.google.com/maps/@39.8132577,-86.2110254,12z.
11
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Kessler Boulevard

Kessler Boulevard is highlighted.12

"Google Maps." Google Maps. Accessed December 15, 2014.
https://www.google.com/maps/dir/39.8555512,86.0841166/1650+W+Kessler+Blvd+N+Dr,+Indianapolis,+IN+46222/@39.8068968,86.2248967,12z/data=!4m9!4m8!1m0!1m5!1m1!1s0x886b57067952f211:0x71257763ddcddb52!2m2!1d86.2110625!2d39.7884985!5i2.
12
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Indianapolis and Portland Combatting Urban Sprawl
The Indianapolis and Portland experiences with urban sprawl have occurred
during roughly the same time period but they each came up with far different solutions.
Before the enactment of Unigov in 1970, the Indianapolis city limits were eighty-two
square miles, roughly the same area as its Center Township. After the passage of Unigov,
the city would expand to 402 square miles.13 The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act had led
to an explosion of highway construction in the 1950s and 1960s to link seven major
national highways at Indianapolis. This created a lot of expansion and growth in the
Indianapolis area. Housing developments north of the city in Washington Township were
some of the first to appear. They were moderately priced subdivisions that sold houses to
new residents and emigrants from the inner city.14 These subdivisions were then followed
in the mid-1960s by a large influx of suburban apartment complexes that would end up
surrounding the periphery of the pre-Unigov city.15
With construction of the 1950s and 1960s, Marion County population rose from
697,567 in 1960 to 785,085 in 1970.16 Most of this growth, however, was outside of the
city limits as the Center Township’s population dropped from 333,351 in 1960 to
273,598 in 1970.17 The surge in population to the suburban townships did not stop at the

David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1353.
14
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Politics of Metropolitanization: City-County Consolidation in Indianapolis,
Indiana, 1971. (Retrieved from Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University), 9.
15
Ibid., 10.
16
Ibid., 10-11.
17
"The Official Website of the City of Indianapolis and Marion County." Population Change (2000-2010).
Accessed February 9, 2015.
13
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county line. Hamilton and Johnson Counties gained 13,758 and 17,067 residents,
respectively, over the same ten year period. This equaled a thirty-three percent increase in
population for Hamilton County and a forty percent increase for Johnson County.18
Indianapolis, specifically Center Township, continued the trend of a decreasing
population and during the 1970s lost 65,000 residents as nearly twenty percent of the
population moved.19 The out-migration of the higher- and middle-class residents
produced a district that was not focused on education. This created a loss of tax revenue
and a significant loss in local civic leadership. The affluent were the first to leave in a
large human migration known as “white flight,” mostly because they had the means and
the ability to leave more than anyone else. This division of society created an inner city
with few examples or connections to middle class society.
The signs of downtown Indianapolis’ demise had been slowly adding up.
Downtown Indianapolis in the early 1960s had become a place for only work and
government. There were no cultural attractions and most businesses closed between 5:00
p.m. and 6:00 p.m. The trash in the central canal and the abandoned meat packing plants
along the White River produced a foul odor that kept people away from downtown.
Pigeons even became such a problem that until 1970 the city was paying four men to

http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/DMD/Planning/Stats/Census/Pages/population.aspx.
18
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Politics of Metropolitanization: City-County Consolidation in Indianapolis,
Indiana, 1971. (Retrieved from Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University), 11.
19
William Hudnut III, The Hudnut Years in Indianapolis, 1976-1991, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1995), 201.
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shoot pigeons every Sunday.20 These four men would average over 400 pigeons per
Sunday but families, especially with small children, were displeased with this method.
The Indianapolis Republican party in the 1960s was also going through a changing
of the guard, with a number of new young professionals ready to improve the city and
develop a national reputation. Mayors of Indianapolis after World War II were focused
on reversing the effects of suburbanization which was diminishing the city’s tax base but
were keen on accomplishing this without federal assistance. A tradition of a part-time
mayor was strong in the city. For example, in the early 1960s the Indianapolis mayor was
paid $12,000 to manage a government serving over 500,000 people.21
Mayor Richard Lugar
Richard Lugar was one of these young professionals who realized Indianapolis
was going to need more than a part-time mayor. Lugar would eventually become the
mayor (1968-1976) and a United States senator from Indiana (1977-2013). Richard Lugar
got his start in politics by winning a seat for the 1964 Indianapolis School Board of
Commissioners. Soon into the campaign Lugar quickly become known as the “silver
tongued orator.”22 He is a fifth generation Hoosier and graduated in 1950 from Shortridge
High School. In 1954 he graduated from Denison University in Granville, Ohio where he

Ted Green, "Naptown to Super City : How a Civics-Sports Strategy Transformed Indianapolis,"
PBS, http://video.wfyi.org/video/2282207842/.
21
David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 935-936.
22
Emma Lou Thornbrough, 1993. The Indianapolis story: school segregation and desegregation in a
northern city. (Manuscript)(Indiana Historical Society, 1994), 184.
20
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was co-president of the student government with his future wife Charlene Smeltzer. He
was also a member of Phi Beta Kappa fraternity.23 Afterwards Lugar attended Pembroke
College at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar where he received a second bachelor's
degree and a master's degree in 1956.24
When Lugar ran for mayor he was only 35 years old; he had previously been a
former vice president of Community Action Against Poverty (CAAP), and executive at
Thomas I. Green and Co. In the Republican Primary, Lugar defeated Alex M. Clark, a
former mayor of Indianapolis. This was due in part to Lugar’s association with the
Republican Action Committee (RAC) which was a group of young Republicans who
formed after the major defeats in the 1964 election. They wanted to take control of the
Republican Party. Lugar gave nearly 400 speeches and was able to defeat Mayor John
Barton with 72,278 votes to 63,284 votes.25 Republicans also won a six-to-three majority
on the City Council which was attributed to a low turnout for Democrats in Center
Township and the good organization of the RAC. This helped set the stage for the
passage of Unigov two years later in 1969.26 The old city of Indianapolis boundaries was
essentially Center Township.

Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne
Publishing, 2006), 112.
24
"Richard G. Lugar, United States Senator for Indiana - Press Releases." July 30, 2008. Accessed
November 23, 2014.
http://web.archive.org/web/20080730212313/http:/lugar.senate.gov/bio/extended.cfm.
25
Ibid., 537.
26
Ibid., 538.
23
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After Lugar won the 1967 mayoral election he made his inaugural address on
Sunday, January 7th 1968 at Butler University’s Clowes Hall to around 1,700 supporters.
He spoke of his disappointing tenure on the Indianapolis School Board where he felt his
progressive views on school integration cost him leadership of the board. “As a School
Board member, I fought for the concept that we must gear our plans and polices to meet
the total needs of the community; in due course, my effectiveness was terminated and I
was exiled to a point out of mind if not out of sight,” stated Lugar.27
The election of Lugar was a turning point in Indianapolis politics. Before Lugar’s
nomination, in the 1963 election Democrats won the mayor’s office with Barton and they
also won a City Council majority, and in 1964 they won control of the governorship, both
houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and the Marion County legislative delegation.
With Democratic control throughout the Indiana and the Indianapolis government,
Democrats decided to reform the Indianapolis government structure. Bills were
introduced in the state legislature which aimed to give the mayor’s office broad powers of
appointment and removal. These moves were unpopular from the start and were dubbed a
“power grab” by the Indianapolis News editor M. Stanton Evans; the term stuck and was
partly responsible for the reform movement’s defeat.28

Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne
Publishing, 2006), 114.
28
Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 10-11.
27
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Most of the bills sent to the state legislature were not sponsored by Mayor Barton
but by Jim Beatty, the Marion County Democratic chairman. When it became evident
that the bills would not pass, Mayor Barton and Governor Roger Branigan (D) became
reluctant to mention the issue. Beatty’s changes to Indianapolis government involved
only existing administrative agencies and they would not have altered any jurisdictions.
These proposals were also met with harsh criticism from the public and media, which
was clearly noticed by members of the Republican Party.29 Beatty tried to unseat Mayor
Barton in the primary; he was unsuccessful but did enough to split the Democratic Party
so that in the general election Lugar was able to unseat the incumbent mayor.30

Ibid., 112.
David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 537.
29
30
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Marion County Nine Township map.31

"Township Maps, 2010." Township Maps: STATS Indiana. Accessed December 15, 2014.
http://www.stats.indiana.edu/maptools/townships.asp.
31
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Republican Action Party and Unigov
With the 1968 elections, the Republican Party was back in power in Indiana.
There was now a Republican governor, Edgar Whitcomb, and two-to-one majorities in
both houses of the Indiana General Assembly. These victories were key to the passage of
Unigov. This was part of a plan that had been hatched following the beating Republicans
sustained in Indianapolis following the 1964 election. The RAC successfully challenged
the party organization in the 1966 primary election when L. Keith Bulen, a prosperous
attorney, became the Marion County Republican chairman.32 The RAC provided support
in the nomination of Governor Whitcomb, and Mayor Lugar also hit the campaign trail
throughout the state for Republican legislative candidates.33
Prior to November, 1968, discussions about Unigov were among a small group of
people but with the political victories of 1968, Unigov started to look like a possibility.
The process for passing Unigov was a rapid one, with coordinated action from the
legislature which was set to convene in January, because the 1969 session was only set to
last for 61 days. This gave the impression to the casual observer that Unigov appeared in
November and was passed into law by March.34
The municipal government structure when Mayor Lugar was elected in 1967 had a
nine-member city council, known as the Common Council. Members were elected at

Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 13-14.
Ibid., 14.
34
Ibid., 17-18.
32
33
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four-year intervals by a hybrid district/at-large system. The two major parties would each
field six council candidates, one for each of the city’s six council districts. These twelve
candidates would appear on an at-large ballot and the top nine vote earners would then
constitute the new Common Council.35 This system ensured each party would get at least
three council seats, and procedures adopted informally would also ensure the election of
at least one black council member. The mayor was also elected to four year terms and
held appointment and veto powers.
Unigov came to life though the RAC which put together the basis for the bill well
before any plans were released to the public. Key members of the RAC included Lugar as
well as Marion County Council president Beurt SerVaas, Indianapolis Common Council
president Thomas C. Hasbrook, Marion County Republican Party chairman Bulen, State
Representatives Larry Borst and John Mutz, RAC chairman John Burkhardt, and
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce executive vice-president Carl Dortch. This
committee met throughout 1968, most often in Burkhardt’s home, to discuss the pros and
cons of city-county consolidation and strategies for adoption.36
SerVass even went so far as to raise funds and secure attorney Lewis C. Bose to
compose a memorandum exploring the legal dimensions of metropolitan consolidation.
Bose pointed out to the group that Indiana did not have a tradition of local home rule,
meaning that the state had complete legal authority over local government structure and

Ibid., 1350.
David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1350.
35
36
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powers. He noted that consolidation could be passed by the General Assembly without an
amendment to the Indiana Constitution or a public referendum.37 Bose headed the legal
task force for which at least eight men were needed in preparing the 162 page proposal.38
During the quiet private meetings at the Burkhart home many ideas and problems
were discussed that would be associated with a consolidated government. SerVass,
Lugar, Burkhart, and Borst were strongly for the efficiencies of a consolidated
government. The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce was also on board. At first it was
William Book, and then in 1968 it became Dortch, advancing programs to eliminate
duplication and inefficiency in government.39 At the same time the RAC remembered the
1965 Democratic attempt to expand the power of the city and its mayor over Marion
County without expanding the vote countywide. Borst credited SerVass for coming up
with the name “Unigov.”40
After large scale victories in the 1968 local and state elections, the Republican
Party controlled the Indianapolis mayor’s office, the Indianapolis City Council, the
Marion County Council, the Marion County delegation to the Indiana General Assembly,
both houses of the General Assembly, and the governor’s office. Republicans held
seventy-three seats in the one hundred seat State House of Representatives and thirty-five
of fifty seats in the Senate. This included all eight state senators and 15 state
Ibid., 1350.
Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 16.
39
Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne
Publishing, 2006), 118-119.
40
Lawrence Borst, Gentlemen, It’s Been My Pleasure: Four Decades in the Indiana Legislature. (Guild
Press Emmis Books, 2003), 84.
37
38
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representatives from Marion County.41 These victories created a political climate that
allowed for Unigov to be passed quickly and with little debate. Before the 1968 election
Lugar created a forty member Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC)
Governmental Reorganization Task Force to further and refine the consolidation strategy.
The GIPC was a private, not-for-profit, non-partisan civic improvement organization
funded by foundation grants and private contributions. It was created under Mayor
Barton in 1964 to function as an advisory arm of the mayor’s office and continues to
operate today.42
On September 4th, 1968 Mayor Lugar went public with the first step of
consolidating the government by focusing on combining the data processing and possibly
employee fringe benefits for the city and county employees. Lugar arranged a meeting
with SerVass, chairman of the Marion County Council, and Hasbrook, who chaired the
City Council. An agreement was put into place for a committee to study how combining
these functions of government might work. The media understood this to mean that a
government consolidation bill would be prepared for the 1969 session of the Indiana
General Assembly.43
The next step in creating Unigov was creating the Governmental Reorganization
Task Force. This task force was created by Mayor Lugar and co-chaired by SerVass and

David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1351.
42
Ibid., 639.
43
Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne
Publishing, 2006), 118-119.
41
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Hasbrook. There were around thirty people with diverse backgrounds charged with going
public with the Unigov concept. The goal was to get lots of points of view and hear any
concerns so a more detailed plan could be created. The RAC was also able to get more
talented people to donate their time such as lawyer Charles Whister, who was one of
many to research existing laws and study the technical issues of special taxing districts.44
Following the vetting and discussion by the SerVaas-Hasbrook committee, it came
time to sell the benefits of consolidated government to the broader community. Lugar
took the lead: “I took advantage of that situation because people had become interested in
Indianapolis. I was on television every night; I was giving reports to the people. I
addressed Lincoln Days around the state, and began to meet with Republicans that I knew
were going to be a part of the General Assembly. I am sure Keith (Bulen) was doing the
same thing, although we did not coordinate our efforts.”45
The final step in the process of getting Unigov passed into law was drafting the
bill and having it voted on in the General Assembly. Since Indianapolis did not have
home rule, a referendum was not needed to change the structure of Indianapolis
government. In 1968 Borst won a seat in the Senate of the Indiana General Assembly.
Lugar’s legislative team thought it best that the Unigov bill should start in the Senate
with Borst introducing it as the principal author. Unigov became Senate Bill 543 and on
February 15, 1968, it passed with the minimum constitutional majority, twenty-six-to-

44
45

Ibid., 121-122.
Ibid., 122.
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eighteen. The bill was then sent to State Representative Henry E. Lamkin Jr., chairman of
the committee on affairs of Marion County, in the House of Representatives, where he
was to help the bill on its way.46
Lamkin was able to move the bill out of his Republican-controlled committee and
onto the House calendar. Republicans did face some Democratic opposition and had to
vote down restrictive amendments at the second reading stage. One of these amendments
would have required a referendum. SB 543 moved to the third reading calendar to await
the call of Speaker Otis Bowen for a vote on the final passage in the House.47 This proved
to be the most difficult part of the process of passing Unigov because of a poor decision
by Mayor Lugar.
Lamkin, who was in communication with Mayor Lugar, was worried that Bowen
was holding the Unigov bill too long on the second reading calendar and feared Bowen
had intent to kill the bill. This fear came from the fact that the RAC had run a candidate
against Bowen for speaker of the house in 1966.48 Lugar responded to Larkin’s concern
by asking for Bowen’s private phone number. Lugar then went on and called a press
conference and asked the public to use Bowen’s telephone number to urge him to pass
Unigov. This had the effect of driving Bowen away, and Bowen’s staff reported they
received more negative than positive calls about Unigov.49
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The press conference that Lugar had called took place on a Friday and by
Saturday, February 21st and 22nd respectively, Lugar had sent a note of apology to
Bowen. Part of the letter was excerpted in the Sunday issue of the Indianapolis Star in
which Lugar stated: “As I watched your interview on TV last evening, I realized I had
been misinformed about the mechanics of calling down bills for consideration. I believe
you were quite correct in calling House-originated bills first, and your point that Unigov
was barely 12 hours past second reading was well taken.”50 Bowen felt no apology was
required and realized that the Unigov supporters wanted the bill moved to the front of the
line, but Bowen would make no special accommodations for the bill. When Bowen
finally handed down SB 543, it passed sixty-six to twenty-nine, following a largely
partisan vote.51
The reason why Speaker Bowen did not need Lugar to apologize was because the
RAC was willing to support Bowen on two of his initiatives. The first was his desire for a
general tax increase to raise state revenues which Governor Whitcomb was firmly
against. The other initiative was in support of Speaker Bowen’s desire to become
Governor, which he did, serving from 1973 until 1981.52
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Portland Political Structural Changes
Portland, Oregon since the 1970s has been a leader in combatting urban sprawl. It
has used federal funds to build a public transit system that has supported its downtown.
The city has worked with the state to not subsidize suburban housing developments. The
residents and leaders of Portland value sustainable growth. Portland since the 1970s has
been the national leader in urban planning and is the prime example for all American
cities to immolate. Portland has even changed its political structure to better govern its
growing city.
Compared to Portland, Oregon in 1970, Indianapolis was about the same size in
area. Portland in 1970 was eighty-nine square miles, contained 382,619 residents, and
was the thirty-fifth largest city in the nation. Indianapolis had a population of 744,624 in
1970, with a population density per square mile of 1,963 residents, whereas Portland’s
population density was 4,294.53 Between 1970 and 2000 the metropolitan area of
Portland grew by one million people. There has been some cause for concern for Portland
since the 1970s; notably, married family households have declined in both absolute
numbers and as a percentage of households within Portland. Several inner city
neighborhoods have seen a decline in the percentage of families with school-aged
children as well as a decline in the overall median age of residents between 1990 and
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2000.54 Married families with children were also the residents that Indianapolis has
wanted to attract back to its downtown as well.
Portland’s political structure began to change in the late 1950s with the
Metropolitan Planning Commission (1957-1966), which undertook data inventory and
studies of economic and land-use conditions. In 1966, the organization evolved into
the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG, 1966-1978), and was a
regional planning agency. CRAG met the federal requirements for transportation,
housing, and sanitation planning to be coordinated on a regional basis before federal
funds could be allocated to improve infrastructure. From 1966 to 1974, local
governments could choose whether or not to be part of CRAG; participation was
mandated by legislative action from 1974 to 1978. In May of 1978 CRAG was voted to
be merged with the Metropolitan Service District, MSD (1970-1978), which was
responsible for solid-waste planning. Shortly after the approval by voters, the agency's
governing body changed the official name to Metro. Metro serves the urbanized areas of
Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington Counties. Since January 1979, Metro has
remained the only directly elected regional government for any United States
metropolitan area.
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Metro’s Organizational Family Tree.55
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Portland, Oregon Metropolitan Statistical Area Map

(Interstate 405 runs through downtown Portland)
Map of Portland-Vancouver MSA.56

Originally, Metro had a directly elected executive officer and a twelve member
council. The district boundaries were drawn to cross city and county boundaries, so that
councilors would see themselves as direct representatives of the citizens rather than as
agents of pre-existing units of local government (analogous to members of the state
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legislature). In 1992, voters adopted a home-rule charter for Metro that reduced the
number of councilors to seven and created an independently elected auditor. The most
recent structural change to Metro came with charter amendments that went into effect in
2003. The new arrangement abandoned the separation of powers model for something
analogous to a mayor-council system. The council consisted of six members elected from
districts and a council president elected at large. The council president set agendas and
made appointments to all Metro committees, board, and commissions. Metro was
responsible for the planning of land-use, transportation, open space, solid waste and
disposal, the Oregon Zoo, and the convention and performance venues.
Portland also received support from Oregon’s Republican Governor Tom McCall
(1967-1975), who proposed legislation that required local governments to complete
comprehensive zoning plans. This would provide Portland the resources to enforce local
land planning measures. In 1973, land-use planning again became a major issue and
ended up surviving three different statewide referendums. The final bill did not go as far
as McCall originally intended; a compromise bill forged by L.B. Day, McCall’s head of
the Department of Environmental Quality, created the Land Conservation and
Development Commission.57
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Urban Growth Boundary
The 1973 establishment of a mandatory planning program administered by a state
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), required every Oregon city
and county to prepare a comprehensive plan that responded to a set of statewide goals
and thus had created a system of strong local planning carried on within enforceable state
guidelines that express a vision of the public interest. This also provided the legal basis
for Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) that was established in 1979.58 Oregon’s
land-use system and UGBs were an attempt to make development choices intentional and
public rather than bit-by-bit which was favored by private companies.59 The “Portland
Revolution” of the 1970s was in full gear.
The UGB in 1979 was thought to have encompassed a twenty-year supply of
developable land when it decided on its 369 square mile area. Outlying areas have their
own UGBs and the intent is to prevent sprawl by providing for “an orderly and efficient
transition from rural to urban use.”60 Therefore, a burden rests on any developer wishing
to use land outside the boundary to prove that it is of little value as resource land or farm
land and that adequate land inside the UGB does not exist. By limiting speculative
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development of large distant residential tracts, the LDC system has discouraged the
emergence of “super developers” with overwhelming political clout.61
The Unconsolidated Unigov
In Indianapolis consolidation was also partially seen as a loss of local control and
independence. Due to this there was intense local opposition to expanding the
consolidation of other local government functions; the eleven school districts in Marion
County were not consolidated, nor was the city fire department with the township fire
departments, or the city police with the county sheriff. The township system of providing
poor relief was also left intact. The incorporated cities of Beech Grove, Lawrence,
Southport, and the town of Speedway would not be absorbed into the new municipal
government because one municipality cannot annex property within another municipality
without consent, regardless of the size of either municipality.62 However, since these
residents paid county taxes they would be allowed to vote for the county-wide executive
and council.63
The county offices of auditor, clerk, coroner, prosecutor, recorder, sheriff,
surveyor, and treasurer would not be changed in any way since doing so would require an
amendment to the Indiana Constitution. Six of the sixteen independent municipal
corporations providing local government services within Marion County would remain
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independent. These were the Capital Improvement Board, the City-County Building
Authority, the Health and Hospital Corporation, the Indianapolis Airport Authority, the
Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation, and the Indianapolis-Marion County
Public Library.64
Before being passed by the state legislature, Unigov faced multiple sources of
opposition. The Democrats objected to the obvious partisan advantage to be gained by the
Republicans in shifting the electoral base of Indianapolis government from the city to the
county. Black residents of Indianapolis were fearful of losing the small political influence
they had before the addition of 250,000 mostly white residents from the county. Public
officials and residents of nearby communities were also worried that Indianapolis might
one day expand past the county line. A “Minigov” amendment had a provision in it that
blocked the new Consolidated City of Indianapolis from annexing territory outside
Marion County. This amendment deflected concerns of suburban Republicans and kept
them from joining the Democrats and the black community of Indianapolis from forming
a unified opposition to the Unigov bill.65
Overall, Unigov reduced the number of local governments from sixty in 1967 to
fifty in 1970. The territorial jurisdiction of Indianapolis expanded from 82 to 402 square
miles and increased the population from 480,000 to 740,000. The new City-County
Council had twenty-nine members with twenty-five representing single-member districts
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and the remaining four were elected at-large. All seats on the Council were up for
election every four years and there was no term limit for the number of times a councilor
could serve. The City-County Council also appointed a clerk who served a one year
term.66
The mayor of the new Consolidated City of Indianapolis is elected to a four year
term at the same time the City-County Council is elected. Following an amendment in
1983, there is now no limit on the number of terms a mayor may serve. The mayor does
have veto power over the City-County Council, but the veto can be overridden if twothirds of the council can agree. With the mayor as the head of the executive branch, there
are six departments which he directly controls. They are Administration, Metropolitan
Development, Parks and Recreation, Public Safety, Public Works, and Transportation.67
Unigov did not affect the Marion County court system and did not remove any of
the nine township governments that independently elected township assessors,
constables, and trustees. The nine township trustees continued to administer poor relief
within their respective jurisdictions. Eight of the nine townships, Center Township being
the exception, were the territorial basis for eight volunteer fire departments and for eight
of the county’s eleven separate public school districts. The other three school districts
were Southport, Beech Grove, and Speedway.68
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The reason why Beech Grove, Speedway, Lawrence, and Southport exist as
separate cities is due to the Unigov law having excluded from reorganization any
incorporated town with a population over 5,000. Therefore, these governments remained
intact but the residents of the excluded cities also pay county taxes and receive county
services. They are able to vote for the Consolidated City mayor and for a district CityCounty councilor and the four at-large City-County councilors. Special Service Districts
and Special Taxing Districts are also allowed under the Unigov bill, each performing a
local government function over a specified domain, financed by a levy upon the residents
within the specified area.69 This has created considerable complexity to the Unigov
structure and has forced some residents to pay for both city and county services. An
example of this is when Center Township residents pay for city police and the sheriff
while county residents are not taxed for the city police services.
Unigov was also unable to merge the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD) with the
11 township fire departments. Volunteer fire departments are a long standing fixture in
less urban Indiana communities, by which volunteer firemen have become “a strong
cultural and social institution.” Therefore, it was expected that any challenge in the
legislature over the sovereignty of volunteer fire departments would be met with strong
resistance from rural legislators.70 There has yet to be a unified effort to unite multiple
fire departments inside of Marion County. Even the state legislature in 1982 created a bill
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in the Senate to give the City-County Council greater authority to consolidate IFD with
the 11 townships fire departments but the bill died in committee. In the absence of a
consolidation, IFD has a mutual aid agreement with surrounding townships and since
1991 has had dual response pacts with Perry, Washington, and Warren Townships with
the closest apparatus responding regardless of boundary lines. IFD also has the smallest
taxing district in the city, ninety-three square miles.71
Fire department consolidation did start to happen in 2007 with Washington and
Warren Township Fire Departments merging with IFD. Perry Township followed in
2009, Franklin Township in 2010, and Lawrence Township in 2011.72 The autonomy of
the township fire departments became too expensive to maintain. The Lawrence
Township firefighters who were transferring to IFD received a raise in pay and in pension
while at the same time leading to a substantial savings for tax payers.73
The Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) has faced a number of serious problems
after the enactment of Unigov. In 1974 three Indianapolis Star reporters won a Pulitzer
Prize for a number of articles alleging police brutality, pervasive political influence in
appointments and promotions, shakedowns, embezzlement of funds, ghost employment,
and connections to brothels and known burglars. What was unique to this story was that
the Star reporters were able to get over 50 officers to violate the “code of silence.” At the
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end of Mayor Lugar’s term in 1975, he stated that reform of IPD had eluded his best
efforts. From 1982 through 1991 a disciplinary board of captains found guilty over
ninety-eight percent of the 1,453 officers brought up on departmental charges ranging
from tardiness to criminal acts. IPD has also faced serious community relations problems
since the 1970s. Controversial police shooting fatalities, harassment, excessive force, the
citizen complaint process, and the absence of credible civilian review have been some of
the main complaints from citizens.74
It was not until 2007 that a law enforcement merger happened in Indianapolis. The
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was established on January 1, 2007 by
consolidating the former Indianapolis Police Department with the law enforcement
division of the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. The ordinance assigned
responsibility for the police department to the sheriff who appointed a chief of police,
under whose direction the department operated.75 The jurisdiction covers all of Marion
County except for the Indianapolis Airport, Speedway, Beech Grove, and Lawrence. A
2014 study by the city revealed that the anticipated savings of the merger have yet to
materialize.76
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Revitalizing Downtown Indianapolis
Market Square Arena (viewed from the Soldiers and Sailors Monument)

Market Square Arena sitting just east of the City Market building.77

The Lugar administration initiated a number of projects and got the ball rolling for
the revitalization of downtown Indianapolis. These projects included amateur and
professional sports, higher education, restoring cultural landmarks, and working with
private and philanthropic organizations to make these plans a reality. One of the first
projects to revitalize Indianapolis’ downtown was Market Square Arena (MSA) which
was opened on September 15, 1974 as the fifth largest sports arena in the nation at the
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time. MSA sat above the intersection of Market Street and Alabama and was located next
to the City Market. The idea was to build a sports stadium downtown to bring
Indianapolis’ only enduring major league professional team, the American Basketball
Association’s Pacers, downtown as well.78 The Indianapolis Racers, a short-term major
league hockey team in the World Hockey Association from 1974 to 1978, also called
MSA home.79 Before the move the Pacers were playing their home games at the Indiana
State Fairgrounds Coliseum. Using a surplus of federal funds, Lugar was able to build an
arena but did require that it would be downtown. MSA was built for $23.5 million and
brought new life to downtown. MSA hosted a number of memorable events such as
Wayne Gretsky’s first professional goal for the Indianapolis Racers, Elvis Presley’s final
concert, and even the 1980 NCAA Final Four.80
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City Market (as seen from the Market Street and Delaware Street intersection)

City Market located half a block west of the former Market Square Arena.81

The renovation of the City Market located at 222 E Market Street began in 1972
and lasted until 1977. This was a major undertaking for the revitalization of downtown.
In 1974 it became listed in the National Register of Historic Places due to its being
originally built in 1886. After being renovated the City Market now contains many
different restaurant stalls but caters mostly to the downtown working class of the City-
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County building that sits directly across the street.82 The Lilly Endowment was also
instrumental in the renovations of the City Market by providing $4.7 million in 1974. 83
The Lilly Endowment has been a constant ally for the city since the enactment of Unigov
and is the main reason Indianapolis or Indiana has not needed to raise property taxes in
order to sustain the city’s major projects through the 1970s and 1980s.
Hyatt Regency Hotel and Eagles Nest

Hyatt Regency Hotel and the rotating Eagles Nest Restaurant sitting atop.84
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The Merchants Plaza is another part of the Lugar Administration’s downtown
initiative and at the time was the largest privately developed project in the state’s history.
The plaza takes up an entire city block; South Illinois Street is the eastern boundary with
South Capitol Street to the west, West Washington Street to the north and Maryland
Street as the southern boundary. The trapezoid designed complex hosts twin 15-story
office towers, the office of Merchants National Bank (the company has since been bought
out), the 535-room Hyatt Regency Hotel, which offers underground parking, and also
contains restaurants and shops on the first three floors. The trademark of the Hyatt is the
atrium which is a 19-story open lobby that is one of the largest enclosed spaces in the
country. There is also a restaurant called The Eagles Nest located on the 20th floor of the
building. The restaurant rotates, offering diners an unparalleled view of the city.85
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
The Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPUI) campus on the
Near Westside is one of the most complicated projects that has been undertaken. Today
the campus occupies the area between Michigan Street and New York Street that runs
west of West Street. The White River acts as a natural boundary on the west side of
campus. The motivation for I.U. and Purdue to merge in 1969 came from the desire of
Lugar and the rest of the RAC for an independent state university in Indianapolis. Earlier
efforts had been made to improve the educational opportunities for those in Indianapolis
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but movement was slow at first. In 1964 the Metropolitan Plan Commission released
detailed maps of a city plan for a three-part campus of 460 acres. The commission
estimated it would take 20 years to complete. One of the reasons for this new campus
proposal was legislative concern about the ability of the medical school to accommodate
the growing demand for medical training. A study committee of the state legislature was
also looking into either expanding or creating a second medical school for the state,
something other state universities, notably Ball State in Muncie, IN, were eager to
acquire. It was also noted that a four-year campus in Indianapolis would help attract more
experienced faculty.86
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IUPUI Campus

IUPUI sits on the west side of downtown Indianapolis, just north of the White River State Park.87

Matters of higher education were at the forefront of nearly everyone’s mind in
Indianapolis in the 1960s. A study commission report in 1961 on the post-high school
educational needs of the state led to the 1963 establishment of the Indiana Vocational and
Technical School, otherwise known as Ivy Tech. I.U. and Purdue saw this as a potentially
dangerous rival and opened their own regional campuses in all of Ivy Tech’s thirteen
regions throughout the state. In 1968 the Stoner Commission’s report was released and
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recommended the creation of a powerful statewide board of regents, one that would
oversee the decisions of the boards of trustees in charge of operating the five state
universities and control other matters of educational policy and finances. In defense of
their autonomy, the universities managed to prevent the adoption of the recommendation
for a board of regents by the state legislature at its next session in 1969. The idea of a
board of regents was replaced in 1971 when the legislature created a less powerful
organization called The Commission of Higher Education.88 This motivated I.U. and
Purdue to the point where much of the initial planning for the merger of IU and Purdue’s
Indianapolis campuses took place behind closed doors in unrecorded meetings.
Mayor Lugar had also made a number of statements about establishing a state
school in Indianapolis. At least one of the upcoming bills in the state legislature would
call for the transfer of all existing public university property in the city to a newly created
school. I.U. and Purdue administrators quickly realized that they would need more than a
shared site for the regional campuses in Indianapolis to alleviate the pressure coming
from the legislature. Mayor Lugar felt that a key factor to a great city was the strength of
a distinguished city university. He saw a great need for a university to offer course work
that would foster technology, scientific growth, and research. Mayor Lugar also said,
“The government of the state and the city of Indianapolis is in need of the personnel, the
discussion forums, and the many other contributions which a great university can make to
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a good government.”89 He saw no reason why a university in Bloomington or West
Lafayette needed to attempt to manage facilities all over the state of Indiana. Lugar also
felt a board of regents would be better able to sort out claims of rival universities setting
up extension centers in Indianapolis which would reduce redundancy in programing and
allow that money to be spent elsewhere. He was basing his ideas off of the system the
University of California uses for its multiple campuses.90
The pressure put on I.U. and Purdue by the local Republican Party led to a
mysterious, unpublicized, and unrecorded meeting in Indianapolis of the two university
presidents, Joseph L. Sutton and Frederick L. Hovde, and some of their closest associates.
The first public announcement came from the Indianapolis News on January 22, 1969. At
this undisclosed meeting a merger plan was agreed to by both parties and then by the
Indiana General Assembly in January 1969. Ralph Kramer, head of the Indianapolis
News Lafayette-Purdue bureau, credited Beurt SerVass, president of Marion County
Council, State Senator Larry Borst, and State Representative John Mutz with directly
helping the merger. With both universities being publicly funded the initial meeting
should have been formally documented. While the creation of IUPUI was authorized by
the legislature, it was really established by two nearly identical resolutions adopted by the
two sets of boards of trustees.91
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SerVass and Borst both were hoping that by helping with the administrative
merger they were getting one step closer to the eventual creation of an independent state
university in Indianapolis. SerVass felt the two universities would not work because they
were competitive, wary, guarded, and jealous of each other. He also felt that IUPUI
would never be allowed to grow to its full potential since that could possibly overshadow
I.U. or Purdue. Public sentiment for the new IUPUI campus was less than positive;
WISH-TV even called the universities’ public statements explaining their actions
“pompous” and was dismayed by the slow time table presented. The editorial concluded
with, “If you do not intend to provide us with the services of a major state university,
that’s fine, but don’t give us a lot of educational jargon and paper pipe-dreams to agree to
have a school here someday, maybe.”92
The deal I.U. and Purdue struck called for I.U. to have sole management
responsibility of the Indianapolis campus while Purdue would take sole management in
Fort Wayne. I.U. was now in charge of bringing all I.U. and Purdue operations within
Indianapolis together at one site on the Near Westside of Indianapolis. I.U. would also
have all appropriations and bonding authority for capital construction in Indianapolis and
all personnel would also be paid through Indiana University.93 Total enrollment for I.U.
and Purdue’s Indianapolis campuses in 1968 was 12,689 which included both full and
part-time students. The faculty roster of full and part-time was above 2,500 before the
merger. After the merger IUPUI’s first Chancellor, Maynard K. Hine, held office for the
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first four years until his retirement in 1973.94 The IUPUI Chancellor reports directly to
the President of Indiana University.
After the merger the Indianapolis Star in 1971 conducted 400 interviews of adult
residents (equally divided by gender) of Marion County about their perception of the
newly created IUPUI. The results showed that seventy-nine percent favored eventually
establishing a University of Indianapolis. Seventy-one percent believed the new
university should include the Purdue Campus on Thirty-Eighth Street, the Herron School
of Art, the downtown campus of I.U., and the law school, but not the medical or dental
schools. Harrison Ullmann, head of the Indiana University News Bureau, forwarded the
results and his analysis to Chancellor Hine. Ullmann noted that forty-nine percent of the
respondents who said they were willing to be taxed for support of the proposed new
university also indicated that they strongly favored the idea.95 Indiana and Purdue were
politically astute and could see the writing on the wall if they did nothing; they have
continually stayed just ahead of the state legislature to prevent an autonomous public
university from being created in Indianapolis.
IUPUI’s first commencement occurred on June 9th, 1970 at the Indiana State
Fairgrounds Coliseum. This marked the third time that Purdue University had awarded
undergraduate degrees in Indianapolis and the first time for Indiana University. IUPUI
conferred 1,438 degrees in its first year and 1,727 in its second year, 1971. IUPUI was
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expected to continue to grow since it was located in the political and economic center of
the state with twenty-five percent of the state’s population in the metropolitan area of the
capital city. 1971 alone saw a 13.8 percent increase in IUPUI programs.96 The rate at
which IUPUI grew could never have been accomplished with a newly created university.
However, with such a large percentage of the state’s population located so closely to
downtown, Bloomington and West Lafayette have treated IUPUI as a potential rival and
limited the opportunities available at the Indianapolis campus.
During Mayor Lugar’s two terms his greatest accomplishment by far was the
passage of Unigov, but that was not his only accomplishment. Lugar reversed the city’s
antipathy to federal grants and ushered in a more active role for the city’s administration.
Under the Lugar administration, the city saw the renovation and rededication of the
historic City Market and the development of the Market Square Arena and Merchants
Plaza. City partnerships also enabled the construction of a Hilton Hotel on Monument
Circle.97 Lugar also worked to establish IUPUI as a major university for the city. He was
also a supporter of the women’s movement and an increased political role for women; in
1971 he even created a municipal Task Force on Women. When Lugar left the Mayor’s
office for the U.S. Senate, the National Council on Municipal Performance had named
Indianapolis “The City with the Healthiest Economy in the Nation.” The city’s bond
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ranting was triple-A and in 1974 the city ranked sixth in the nation in the total value of
new building permits.98
While there was no official referendum on Unigov, Lugar’s reelection campaign
ran on the platform of support for Unigov and for continuation of his redevelopment
policies. The residents of Indianapolis supported him overwhelmingly in 1971 when he
defeated John Neff (D) by a four-to-one margin, which amounted to 60.5 percent of all
votes cast.99 This signified that Lugar and the RAC had covered all their bases and
created Unigov in a way that most people in Marion County were willing to accept. This
was a labor intensive task that put in place part of the infrastructure in place for
Indianapolis to have the ability to develop into a major American city.
Mayor William H. Hudnut III
The next Indianapolis Mayor, William H. Hudnut III, served four-terms in office,
from 1976 to 1992. In 1983 the city-county council removed the term limit for
Indianapolis mayor. William Hudnut was born on October 17, 1932 in Glendale Ohio,
just outside of Cincinnati and came from two generations of itinerant Presbyterian
ministers. Hudnut spent most of his childhood living in Springfield, Illinois before the
family moved to Rochester, New York. Hudnut, like his father, attended Princeton
University before attending New York’s Union Theological Seminary. After graduation,
Hudnut accepted a job as assistant Reverend at Westminster Church in Buffalo, NY. By
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the time Hudnut had reached the age of thirty, he was serving as pastor of the First
Presbyterian Church in Annapolis, Maryland. At this time (1963) he was asked by the
Second Presbyterian Church of Indianapolis to be their new minister. In 1973 Hudnut left
his duties as minister to run for Indiana's eleventh congressional district seat, which he
won. Hudnut was unable to win his reelection bid in 1975 due largely to being a
Republican and the public backlash over the Watergate scandal. Indiana’s loss was
Indianapolis’ gain as this allowed Hudnut to run for mayor in 1976; Hudnut defeated
Democrat Robert V. Welch, an Indianapolis businessman, for mayor. For Hudnut, being
mayor was much more satisfying than a congressman, which he proved by turning down
another opportunity to run for Congress in 1982.100
Mayor Hudnut was able to greatly expand the projects for downtown revitalization
but still held many of the same ideas as the Lugar administration when it came to
revitalizing downtown Indianapolis. In order to keep Indianapolis from expanding and
growing uncontrollably, the Hudnut administration held two philosophies: downtown
revitalization and the utilization of arts and sports to promote development. Hudnut
wanted to encourage urban reinvestment without discouraging suburban investment. The
idea was “You can’t be a suburb of nothing.” The goal was to try and stop the city from
turning into a doughnut with all the good development taking place outside the I-465
beltway and the downtown becoming an empty hole; instead, the shape of a cookie was
desired, solid throughout.
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In the early 1970s the Chamber of Commerce had commissioned a study by the
Fantus Corporation which concluded that Indianapolis suffered from a “plain vanilla”
image. To help with this the New York public relations firm of Jack Raymond &
Associates was hired by the city to place favorable stories about Indianapolis in the
national press. The creation of the Indiana Sports Corporation (ISC) was also responsible
for helping create Indianapolis’ image as an amateur sports capital.101 The ISC was
incorporated in 1979 as a private, not-for-profit entity made up of government officials
and business leaders with the goal of making the city a viable option for amateur sporting
events. Sandy Knapp ran the ISC from 1980 to 1991 and has helped to bring $165 million
in sporting facilities and 230 amateur sporting events to Indianapolis with an estimated
economic impact of $400 million.102
Working with other organizations was the Indianapolis Economic Development
Corporation (IEDC), which had been established as a point of contact between the city,
state, and the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce to market the city and pursue new
business opportunities for Indianapolis.103 The highlight of the IEDC is the “Visit Indy”
program that coincides with the 500-mile-race weekend each year in late May. The
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program takes invited guests from companies around the Indianapolis to spend three days
becoming fully exposed to the city’s business potential and quality of life.104
IUPUI Expands Amateur Athletic Venues
IUPUI’s second Chancellor was Dr. Glenn W. Irwin who worked closely with
William Hudnut and Indianapolis in its effort for the redevelopment of downtown. Dr.
Irwin was IUPUI Chancellor from 1973 until 1986. During the Chancellor Irwin years
IUPUI underwent many changes as Irwin was able to stretch the limited resources by
combining efforts in urban renewal and downtown development that were already
occurring. In order for the city to keep the National Clay Courts Tournament, a new $7
million stadium was erected in 1979 and placed on land supplied by IUPUI. It was
located on the south side of New York Street, adjacent to Military Park. Public-private
partnership financing got the complex built as the city allocated $4 million from a
redevelopment bond issue and the Lilly Endowment’s offer of a matching grant of $1.5
million. The matching came as 100 companies pledged $15,000 each by purchasing the
rights to box seats.105 The Indianapolis Tennis Center, as it was known, hosted the ATP
(Association of Tennis Professionals) Tour tournament formerly known as the RCA
Championships for three decades.106
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This is the blueprint that allowed a world class natatorium and track stadium to be
built on the campus of IUPUI as well. State legislators had approved $6 million for a new
track and swimming pool in order to bring the School of Physical Education from its far
north location at a sports camp on West Sixty-Fourth Street.107 In 1980 when outside
funding from the Lilly Endowment and Krannert Charitable Trust became available, a
$21.5 million facility was quickly approved.108 These new plans also called for an
adjacent track and field stadium. A market analysis report concluded that a natatorium
and track and field stadium would make Indianapolis a viable competitor in attracting
major sporting events. The new track stadium and natatorium were completed in time to
host the 1982 National Sports Festival that took place throughout the city. 109
A Dome in Indianapolis
The use of sports to sell Indianapolis gained national recognition and Indianapolis
successfully hosted events such as the 1980 NCAA Men’s Final Four and the 1982
National Sports Festival, now known as the U.S. Olympic Sports Festival. The United
States Olympic Committee (USOC) in 1978 implemented a new national multisport
event that would help develop and prepare the athletes who would eventually represent
the United States in the Olympic Games. This $2 million event was financed through
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ticket sales totaling $1 million, six corporate underwriters, and 250 companies that made
charitable contributions. The Lilly Endowment also contributed a significant amount of
money to the building of venues for this event, including the IUPUI Natatorium with
$21.5 million, the IUPUI track and field stadium with $5.9 million, and the Major Taylor
Velodrome for cycling with $2.5 million.110
However, there was still a growing need for larger stadiums to hold greater
numbers of people for both sports and conventions. In order to make Indianapolis a
potential site of future Final Fours, large conventions, and the one-day hope of a National
Football League (NFL) team, the city would need a huge stadium. Mayor Hudnut felt if
they built it first Indianapolis would be at the top of the list of potential cities for an NFL
team. With an innovative financing plan, Hudnut was able to break ground on the
Hoosier Dome before any commitment was given from a NFL team. The idea was to
expand the Indiana Convention Center by building an $80 million addition, a
multipurpose facility with meeting halls and exhibit space as well as a 60,000 seat
auditorium with an inflated soft top over it. The football stadium was billed as an
auditorium. Mayor Hudnut was quoted as saying, “We would not build a freestanding
facility somewhere just for football. A domed stadium would draw people downtown and
reinforce the core.” The project would be financed by gifts from the Lilly Endowment
($25 million) and the Krannert Charitable Trust ($5 million), the purchase of suites by
private companies and individuals (roughly $3 million), and a $47.5 million city revenue
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bond issue, the debt on which would be financed by a one percent tax on food and
beverage served in Marion County. No property tax money or federal dollars would be
used. A provision in the legislation would provide that after the debt was paid off, the tax
would disappear.111 The Hoosier Dome, later renamed the RCA Dome, had the main
entrance located on Capitol Street.
RCA Dome

The RCA Dome as seen from Capitol Street.112

Between 1982, when the city broke ground for the Hoosier Dome, and 1984, when
Richard Irsay announced that his Baltimore Colts were moving to Indianapolis,
Indianapolis had already booked into the unfinished facility $185 million of new
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convention business for the latter years of the decade. With the completion of the Hoosier
Dome, Indianapolis was able to show the world that it was no longer “Indiana-no place.”
The Hoosier Dome was host to the Colts when they came to town in 1984, the NBA had
its 1985 All-Star game in it with the largest crowd in attendance ever for an All-Star
game, and the Pan-Am Games came in 1987. The 1987 Pan-Am Games introduced
Indianapolis to the rest of the world. The Hoosier Dome would also play host to the 1991
Men’s Basketball Final Four and the city would continually be awarded to host the Final
Four once every five years.113
The 1987 Pan-Am Games were originally awarded to Chile but when it and then
Ecuador back out of hosting, it allowed for Indianapolis to step in. Mayor Hudnut led a
delegation of city leaders to Mexico City to present the city’s bid for the games. A local
organizing committee was formed to carry out planning and staging. This committee
grew to eighteen operational divisions with 300 paid staff members and 37,000
volunteers.114
The games cost roughly $30 million since many of the venues used had been built
for previous events or purposes such as Market Square Arena where the basketball games
were held, Major Taylor Velodrome for cycling, IUPUI natatorium for swimming, and
the track and field stadium as well as other venues. The games were paid for through $9
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million in ticket sales, twenty-two corporate sponsors that contributed a minimum of
$500,000 per sponsor, and eighty-three corporate suppliers who provided more than $2
million in merchandising sales. Another $7 million came from federal government
support in the form of grants and on Athletes Village per-diem.115
The games involved over 6,000 athletes from North, South, and Central America.
Approximately 40,000 volunteered to help the local organizing committee. The opening
ceremonies, colorful and dramatic, were orchestrated by the Walt Disney Company at the
Speedway with nearly 80,000 people in attendance. At the time, this turned out to be the
largest outdoor live entertainment show ever staged in the United States, involving more
than 29,500 volunteer performers. The vice-president of the United States, George H.W.
Bush, even came to town to open the games.116
The games are estimated to have brought in $175 million in direct economic
impact and Indianapolis became the first host city of the games to break even
financially.117 CBS also televised twenty-six hours of the event over three weekends.
There were also 2,100 journalists representing 628 news organizations from thirty-six
nations covering the games.118 This put Indianapolis in a national and international
spotlight as it had never been before. Pan American Plaza, which consisted of the block
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bounded by Union Station, the Hoosier Dome, Georgia Street, and Illinois Street, opened
in 1987 and served as the media center for the games.
White River State Park
Cultural attractions were also in mind for the redevelopment of downtown. The
development of the White River State Park, which is located on both banks, lies just west
of the mile square. It consists of 267 acres between Washington Street and New York
Street.119 In the 1970s the area had become an industrial slum due to multiple factories
leaving the area in the 1960s.120 In 1969 the Indianapolis Water Company discontinued
using the Central Canal for a source of water power at its pumping station on West
Washington Street and thereafter made the "downtown" portion (south of Sixteenth
Street) available for sale.121 In 1971, the Central Canal was dedicated as an American
Water Landmark by the American Water Association. By 1976 the Water Company
deeded this portion of the Canal to the City of Indianapolis, including the old Pumphouse,
which in 1980 was accepted into the National Registry of Historic Places. In 1985 the
Canal was drained south of Interstate 65 and this portion of the Canal was then lowered
and rebuilt using concrete for its banks. The Canal was then refilled with a local
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skyscraper's geothermal heating and cooling system which allowed for using ground
rather than surface water.122
Central Canal from inside the White River State Park

The Central Canal on the west side of downtown Indianapolis.123
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In 1979 the Indiana General Assembly created the White River State Park
Development Commission as a quasi-governmental agency. The Lilly Endowment also
provided $5 million in start-up money for the commission.124 It operates outside of the
state park system and the Department of Natural Resources. This was done so the
Development Commission could build the park without restrictions often placed on state
agencies. The Development Commission is composed of the mayor of the City of
Indianapolis, the president of Indiana University, the director of the Department of
Natural Resources, and seven citizens appointed by the governor for four year staggered
terms. Four members of the Indiana General Assembly also serve as non-voting
members of the White River State Park Development Commission. Headquarters for the
White River State Park Commission was placed in the Historic Pumphouse after the 1980
renovation of the building.125
The first major permanent cultural attraction in the White River State Park was the
Indianapolis Zoo in 1988. Before this the Indianapolis Zoo had been located at
Washington Park on the northeast side of the city. The Indianapolis Zoo is run by the
Indianapolis Zoological Society and in 1979 they commissioned a study to determine the
possibility of moving the zoo. In 1982 the Zoological Society announced its intention to
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relocate to the White River State Park. Construction began in April of 1986 and the zoo
officially opened on June 11, 1988.126
The Zoological Society ran a fundraiser before the move downtown and by
December of 1987 had raised over $63 million. Major support came from the Lilly
Endowment and Krannert Charitable Trust as well as thousands of donations from area
corporations and individuals. These donations are important since the Indianapolis Zoo is
one of the few zoos in the nation that receives no direct tax support. Local support for the
Zoo can be seen in the charter membership that was offered in the spring 1988.The old
zoo membership had been around 11,000 but 74,000 memberships were sold for the
opening of the new zoo. By 1991 the Indianapolis Zoo had over 2,500 animals on sixtyfour acres and employed over 300 people during the summer season. The Zoo hosted
over 900,000 visitors in 1991.127
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Eitleljorg Museum (Main Entrance)

The Eiteljorg Museum as seen from Washington Street.128

The Eiteljorg Museum of American Indian and Western Art was the next cultural
addition to the White River State Park and as of 1993 was one of only two museums east
of the Mississippi to combine collections of American western and Native American art.
The Eiteljorg was opened in 1989 and most of the collection was donated by Harrison
Eiteljorg, an Indianapolis businessman and philanthropist. A large portion of Native
American art and cultural objects were acquired as the result of a merger with the
Museum of Indian Heritage. The museum’s permanent collection includes 400 paintings

"The Museum." Eiteljorg Museum. Accessed December 17, 2014. http://www.eiteljorg.org/about/themuseum.
128

65

and bronzes and 2,000 artifacts. The Eiteljorg is dedicated to preserving and interpreting
the history of the American West through displays, exhibitions, and educational
programs. By 1993 over 125,000 people were annually visiting the museum.129
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Downtown Cultural Attractions
Union Station

Central Station after being repurposed into a festival market place.130

Another downtown cultural attraction is Union Station which was the nation’s first
centralized station for the common use of passengers of many independent rail lines. It
was constructed south of the present station in 1852-1853. The current Union Station was
built in 1887-1888 and was designed in the Romanesque Revival style by Thomas Rodd
of Pittsburgh. This has made it one of the city’s most historically and architecturally
significant buildings. When Penn Central fell into bankruptcy in 1970 Union Station
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nearly shut its doors forever. The building was falling apart but was listed on the National
Register of Historic Places in 1974 and developer Robert Borns turned Union Station into
a festival marketplace to save it. A $30 million restoration project was needed to convert
the building for its new use and the restoration was completed in 1986 with over 100
restaurants and shops ready for business. Results have been less than hoped for with low
revenues, high turnover among shops and poor security. In 1993 over 4.2 million people
visited the 34 retail stores, 18 food outlets, and 7 bars located inside the station.131 The
project enjoyed success for about ten years before encountering financial troubles but
should be credited with laying the foundation for the nearby Circle Centre Mall.132
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Indiana Repertory Theatre

The Indiana Repertory Theatre as seen from Washington Street.133

Another recently renovated downtown landmark is the Indiana Repertory Theatre
located on West Washington Street near the Indiana State House. The theater was saved
in 1980 when the Indiana Repertory Theatre (IRT) needed a new venue with more
performing space for larger crowds. The building was originally built in 1927 and
became listed in the National Register of Historical Places in 1979.134 It stands out among
Indianapolis buildings with its Spanish Baroque exterior of pure white glazed terra cotta.
The Spanish theme is carried through to all major spaces, including the main lobby, upper
"Indiana, Indianapolis, Publix Theatre, Indiana Repertory Theatre (8,122)." Flickr. Accessed December
15, 2014. https://www.flickr.com/photos/23711298@N07/5823438674/.
134
David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 745.
133

69

lobby, theater interior, and Indiana Roof Ballroom.135 The Mainstage Theater seats 600
and is where regular season performances take place. There are also two smaller stages
for smaller productions. The theater underwent a $5 million renovation in 1979-1980 in
order to accommodate the incoming IRT.136
The Children’s Museum of Indianapolis

The Children’s Museum of Indianapolis which lies just north of downtown.137

A unique Indianapolis treasure that has been well supported is the Children’s
Museum of Indianapolis which was originally founded in 1925 and then moved to its
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current location at 3010 N. Meridian Street in 1946. After a number of expansions to the
building it was decided to have a capital fund drive for a new building. In 1973 $8.78
million was raised and the Parry House facilities were demolished. The new building was
completed in 1976 and more than doubled the exhibit space and also added new
classrooms, administration offices, and the 350-seat Ruth Lilly Theater. The building has
five floors in all and includes a mastodon skeleton, carousel, and simulated cave.138
The museum has continued to grow with the city. In 1984 it received the 50,000
item Caplan folk art and toy collection, which nearly doubled the size of the museum’s
holdings. As a result a $14 million expansion project began in 1987 which produced a
new atrium entrance and welcome center that was completed in 1988 and the 130-seat
Space Quest Planetarium completed in 1989. In 1990 the Eli Lilly Center for Exploration
was completed. By 1992, The Children’s Museum was attracting over 800,000 visitors
annually to its 4,000 programs and activities while maintaining a collection of over
140,000 artifacts. It has a staff of approximately 165 full-time employees, 227 part-time,
and over 850 volunteers. The Children’s Museum now encompasses a whole city block
on 30th street between Illinois and Meridian.
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Indiana Avenue
Walker Building and Theatre

The Madame C.J. Walker Building and Theatre as seen from West Street.139

One of the few bright spots for the black community under Unigov was the
restoration of the Madame C.J. Walker Building and Theatre that sits at the corner of
West Street and Indiana Avenue. It was opened in 1927 and was designated a National
Historic Landmark in 1991. Indiana Avenue was originally one of the few areas in the
city that would rent to black residents in the 1920s through the 1950s. During this time

"Madame Walker Theatre Center." Wikipedia. Accessed December 15, 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madame_Walker_Theatre_Center.
139

72

the Indianapolis black community was anchored around the Walker Building and Theatre
on Indiana Avenue. As other parts of the city opened up to blacks, Indiana Avenue and
the Walker Building fell into disrepair. In 1979 the Lilly Endowment provided funds to
the Walker Urban Life Center to buy the building and save it from being demolished.
This restoration project was designed to spur economic redevelopment on Indiana
Avenue.140 It was not until 1988 that the Madame C.J. Walker Building was fully
restored.141 The Walker Building is the best-known historic building associated with the
black community of Indianapolis and in 1991 was designated as a National Historic
Landmark.142
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Outline of Lockefield Gardens

The black outline signifies the original size of the housing project before it was partially torn
down after falling into disrepair.143
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The renovation of Lockefield Gardens located adjacent to the IUPUI campus was
also vital to the redevelopment of the Near Westside. Lockefield Gardens, completed in
1938, was the second oldest public housing project in the country and is one of the few
remnants of the poor African-American community that stood there before the university
arrived. In the 1970s Lockefield Gardens had fallen into vacancy and disrepair, glass
windows were broken out, and doors swung open freely on rusty hinges.144 Lockefield
Gardens had become seriously deteriorated and the city was prohibited by Federal Judge
S. Hugh Dillin from redeveloping the housing for low-income families for fear it would
perpetuate residential segregation and, consequently, educational segregation. In the
summer of 1980 an agreement was reached with the city, the federal government, IUPUI,
preservationists, and former residents. Through all these groups an action plan was
created where the city would declare a portion of Lockefield Gardens an urban renewal
area and make funds available to MEDIC (the neighborhood leadership group).
The plan would also called for work with HUD and the private sector to
accomplish the restoration of up to 275 housing units and another 150 units for the
elderly on the other side of Indiana Avenue and build a new street through the area. The
university also took some of the land for its medical school campus but agreed not to
move any farther. The situation turned around and Lockefield Gardens was fully
occupied by the early 1990s.145 This plan also called for the demolition of two-thirds of

William Hudnut III, The Hudnut Years in Indianapolis, 1976-1991, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1995), 85.
145
Ibid., 86.
144

75

the twenty-four buildings, saving and renovating the rest, while also building several new
apartments on the site for mixed-income housing. The demolition also permitted the
realignment of the street between the apartments and the university.146
Unigov’s Improvement in Education
Notable academic achievement also brought recognition to Indianapolis. IUPUI
Vice Chancellor Edward Moore and noted philosopher Max Fisch organized the Pierce
Edition Project in 1976. The project focused on Charles Sanders Pierce, whose papers
had been saved and brought to IUPUI by Moore. Indiana University Press, with grants
from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation,
had agreed to publish a selection of the Pierce Papers in twenty or more volumes. Pierce
is considered to be the founder of modern semiotics, the general theory of signs, and the
father of pragmatism, a major development in the history of American philosophy. The
first volumes began being published in the early 1980s.147
In the early 1980s, IUPUI also sponsored what was to become the Journal of the
Early Republic, but at the time was a new unnamed journal on a three year trial basis. It
was stipulated that the circulation must reach 1,000 readers by the end of the trial period.
The journal was a venture by the national organization the Society of Historians of the
Early American Republic (SHEAR), who agreed to put its journal within the confines of
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an institution that at the time had no graduate program in the field. Others offered to host
it but SHEAR’s executive council accepted IUPUI’s three year trial offer and the first
issue appeared in April of 1981.148
These academic achievements helped to lead to the creation of the Project On-line
Indianapolis Study which was shorten to POLIS in 1989. POLIS was established to link
two types of expertise, academic and practical, for the benefit of communities in Indiana
and elsewhere. Geospatial technologies, especially GIS, emerged as the preferred
technical tools because of their unique ability to integrate and visualize information by
location. This capacity and the collaborative approach meant that POLIS could develop
and analyze data for any geographic area and involve local experts in helping to
understand what the results would mean for local communities. The first project was the
Encyclopedia of Indianapolis and this was due to Indianapolis having the largest deficit
of knowledge about the city. There was not a lot of published information on Indianapolis
compared to other cities of similar size. 485 authors were needed for the project which
ended up being 1600 pages and was published in 1994.
POLIS is a self-funded research unit of the I.U. School of Liberal Arts at IUPUI.
The POLIS approach to better understand the communities in which we live uses
practical, effective, and cost-efficient ways for communities to be able to enhance their
capacity for meaningful change.149 While the program has provided useful knowledge,
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the benefits to the local community are limited by the fact that the IUPUI School of
Liberal Arts is only able to offer Ph.D. coursework in Economics.
IUPUI has grown tremendously since its inception. Total enrollment for IUPUI
rose steadily between 1969 and 1977, going from 13,382 to 21,700, and then it dropped
to 20,500 in 1978. Enrollment rose to 21,500 in 1979 and 22,800 in 1980. Slight
increases throughout the 1980s and early 1990s carried enrollment to 28,000 in 1992.
According to university self-studies, female students rose from forty-one percent of the
student population in 1972 to fifty-nine percent of the student population in 1992. Other
groups on campus have not been so fortunate; for instance, black student rates fell
slightly from 9.7 percent in 1972 to eight percent in 1992.150
The Indiana University Medical Center on the IUPUI campus has helped to
expand the population and size of the IUPUI campus. When Mayor Hudnut left office in
early 1992, the Medical Center sat on eighty-five acres and was home to the Indiana
Schools of Medicine, Nursing, Dentistry, and Allied Health, and six hospitals with over
2,100 beds. Indiana University owns Riley, University, and Long Hospitals, and has
managed Wishard Memorial Hospital, formally Marion County General, since 1975. The
Indiana Medical School achieved an international reputation in 1963 when a team of
physicians developed the echocardiograph (EKG). Also, an advanced bone marrow
transplant program, the nation’s only noncommercial DNA bank, and the largest pediatric
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cardiology program in the country, have enabled IUPUI to be a leader in medical
research and training.151 These assets and others at IUPUI have allowed for research
grants to increase from $38 million in the 1985-86 school year to $88 million for the
1991-92 school year.152
Indianapolis Economic Development
The Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical Company has been a receptive corporate partner in
downtown development. This is important since it is also the city's largest employer and
most important corporate citizen. The development of a campus on the south side of
downtown includes a large research facility, technology center, new administrative
offices, parking garages, a new production facility for human insulin, and a home for the
new Cray-2 supercomputer. The city vacated the streets, relocated a sewer line, pledged
$44 million toward the reconstruction of several major thoroughfares, and worked on
some river levees. In return Lilly committed approximately $1 billion to new capital
projects it could have built anywhere else in the world. This worked out for the city and
the Lilly campus and could not have been done without each other’s cooperation.153
The early 1990s started off extremely well for Indianapolis. Hosting the 1991
Men’s Final Four brought in an economic impact of $39 million as well as national
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recognition to the city. Indianapolis was able to take advantage of the Hoosier Dome and
the NCAA’s desire to start having the Final Four hosted in larger venues. The United
States Postal Service announced Indianapolis’ bid had been selected as the city for its
new $62 million mail-sorting facility. This proved that Indianapolis could compete
nationally for economic development projects as well as athletic events. The city had
already landed a Federal Express sorting facility for the Indianapolis Airport, making it a
secondary hub to Memphis, which helped in landing the USPS deal. The USPS project
would provide 750 new Postal Service jobs for the Indianapolis area.154
In mid-October of 1991 the foundation was poured for Circle Centre Mall. The
timing was difficult because a general business restructuring and an economic downturn
made investors weary and financing more challenging to obtain. As the economy began
to sour in the late 1980s, it became difficult to arrange financing for commercial projects.
The project took a serious hit when Saks Fifth Avenue pulled out and the developer was
struggling with financing.155 Huge holes pocked the downtown landscape and the city
had already invested $230 million. With the project stalled, Indianapolis’ reputation and
downtown revitalization project were on the line. After Mayor Hudnut visited with CEOs
of several Indianapolis companies, Eli Lilly and Company took the lead, with several
other companies signing on. The final agreement was reached in September of 1991. The
consortium headed by Eli Lilly pledged a total of more than $50 million to become

154
155

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 3.

80

partners with the Simon brothers, Herb and Mel.156 The project would not be completed
until 1995.
Artsgarden at Circle Centre Mall

Indianapolis Artsgarden hovers 17 feet above the intersection of Washington and Illinois streets and
connects to the Embassy Suites complex, the Conrad Hotel, and Circle Centre Mall. 157 It is linked by the
indoor skywalk to the Hyatt Regency, Canterbury, Omni, Westin, Marriott and the Indianapolis
Convention Center. The Artsgarden is owned and operated by the Arts Council of Indianapolis, and
houses the Cultural Concierge, a centralized source for arts calendars, free maps, visitor guides, and
other information on Indianapolis arts and cultural events.158
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Shortly after the pouring of the mall foundation, United Airlines (UAL) chose
Indianapolis as the site for a new billion-dollar facility to maintain its expanding fleet of
Boeing 737s. UAL promised to build a three-million-square-foot complex at Indianapolis
International Airport that would produce 6,300 permanent new jobs within 12 years at an
average annual wage and benefit package of $45,000. The project would also generate an
estimated 12,000 temporary construction jobs and some 18,000 to 20,000 spin-off jobs,
providing a ten-year economic impact of more than $1 billion.159
The other side of the city’s economic development plan in the early 1980s
involved the assistance of Central Research Systems, David Birch of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), and local business and professional leaders for the city’s
economic development. One of the first things they discovered was that Indianapolis
could not ignore manufacturing because of how prominent it was throughout the state.160
Manufacturing was the major industry in both the 1960s and 1970s, employing more than
thirty percent of workers in Marion County.161 Indiana has more factories than farms and
both have a strong lobby at the statehouse. The other finding that came out of this study
was that most of the future job growth for the city would come from small businesses.
Indianapolis was demonstrating a growth in company start-ups, along with small firms
(twenty or fewer people), that was superior to any other city in the nation.162
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The city and David Birch of MIT in the 1980s concluded that certain industries
should be targeted for priority retention/expansion and attraction: industrial automation,
telecommunications, instrumentation and test equipment, health care technology and
services, and software and consumer electronics. The plan also recommended certain
strategic mechanisms to support the effort to capitalize on the city’s resources and assets
such as numerous business start-ups, a growing pool of young, well-educated people, and
a promising foundation in leading edge industries. The mechanisms included an
innovative development corporation, enhanced support for education, innovative
development financing, and a technology-oriented complex. This was to be undertaken in
a three-way partnership between business, education, and government with high-profile
leadership and support.163
Increased government spending also helped local businesses and that has only
been possible though Unigov. In 1971 the city’s expenditures totaled $763 million. The
following year expenditures topped $1 billion and then remained in the $1.1 to $1.25
billion range until the late 1980s, when the city’s expenditures began to rise steadily
through the 1990s. Revenues increased on a similar trajectory, topping $1 billion in 1973
and remaining very stable through the end of the 1980s. By expanding the city’s
boundaries and keeping the growth of higher income residents of the northern Marion
County suburbs within city limits, Indianapolis likely prevented a rise in tax rates to
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support city services.164 Employment growth was also positive in Indianapolis during the
Lugar and Hudnut administrations. Employment in Indianapolis-Marion County grew by
forty-three percent from 1970 to 1989. Most jobs created during this time period were in
the lower paying service sector.165
William Hudnut’s four terms as mayor have often been characterized by an
entrepreneurial spirit that involved collaboration, conciliation, and inclusion. He was a
careful fiscal manager and maintained Indianapolis’ triple-A bond rating. The city had a
surplus of $300 million at the end of Hudnut’s fourth mayoral term. Hudnut had a
penchant for coalition building and used multiple public and private partnerships during
his time as mayor. He expanded the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee and created
the Indianapolis Economic Development Corporation, which helped to reach out to
additional members of the business and civic leadership within the city. Revitalization of
the urban core was the highest priority of his administration and a variety of incentive
packages, job training programs, and infrastructure improvements supported this goal.166
Under both Lugar and Hudnut, Unigov’s accomplishments, with the help of outside
funding, can most clearly be seen in economic development.
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Portland’s Downtown Development
Downtown Portland

Map of downtown Portland.167

Neil Goldschmidt, a Democrat, was the Mayor of Portland from 1973-1979 and
also played a key role in how Portland was able to handle modern urban sprawl. He was
thirty-two years old when he became mayor and his ideas were strongly influenced by the
1970 census that showed a declining proportion of middle class families, neighborhood
diversity and city tax base. During his first term in the mayor’s office, Goldschmidt and
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his team of young policy specialists put together a “population strategy” that emphasized
public transportation, neighborhood revitalization, and downtown planning.168 The
population of Portland was 381,877 in 1970 but growth had not been steady as the 1980
census showed a loss of more than 13,000 residents.

Portland population form 1950-2010.169
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Goldschmidt and his advisors felt that improved public transit would improve air
quality, enhance the attractiveness of older neighborhoods, and bring workers and
shoppers downtown. A vital central business center would protect property values in
surrounding districts and increase their attractiveness for residential reinvestment. With
neighborhood planning, the focus was on housing rehabilitation and on visible amenities
to keep older residential areas able to compete with the suburbs. Preservation of the user
friendly downtown has been the cornerstone of the “population strategy” of the compact
city model.170 Portland was developing better and better amenities for people to live,
work, and spend their leisure time in the downtown.
Metro, which is the directly elected regional government that serves the urbanized
areas of Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington Counties, also operates the park
system, the Oregon Zoo, the downtown Performing Arts Center and oversees the Oregon
Convention Center. Metro has also been designed to be a planning agency and is
designated as the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) for the allocation of federal
transportation funds. This agency maintains the Urban Growth Boundary under the
Oregon land use planning system.171
With the state government of Oregon and the Metro government of Portland
collaborating, the center of Portland has retained its economic dominance in the
metropolitan area. The central office core has upgraded average job quality and increased
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the total number of jobs since the 1970s. Jobs in the five core census tracks increased
from 63,000 in 1970 to 108,000 in 1995 with jobs in adjacent tracts growing from 40,000
to 50,000 during the same time span. Central Portland also claims all major city
institutions and gathering places such as art, history, and science museums, the
Performing Arts Center and the Civic Auditorium, Portland State University and Oregon
Health Sciences University, several major hospitals, the Civic Stadium, the Oregon
Convention Center, and the Rose Garden Arena. Pioneer Courthouse Square in the heart
of the retail core hosts political rallies and community events. It should also be noted that
as of 2001 Portland lacked a “dead zone” of derelict industrial districts and abandoned
neighborhoods that surround the high-rise core of many cities.172
Portland’s lack of a “dead zone” has a lot to do with its public transit system. The
Oregon State Highway Department created plans for the Mt. Hood Freeway in 1955 as
part of a report that advised the Portland area to build fourteen new freeways. In 1969, a
deal was made with the federal Bureau of Public Roads that Mt. Hood Freeway would
be granted status as Interstate 80 North. This meant that the new freeway would be able
to be constructed with ninety-two percent of the $75 million cost coming from the federal
government. Mayor Neil Goldschmidt and other local officials led the public in their
desire to rejuvenate Portland's downtown core, clean up its air, and expand the new
public mass-transit system. Downtown Portland businesses were convinced that a
centrally focused public transit would be more beneficial than a second eastside radial
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freeway.173 The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Federal
Clean Air Act of 1970 proved to be tremendous hurdles for the Mt. Hood Freeway to
overcome.174
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Map of Proposed Freeway

This map from the Portland Planning Division's 1966 development plan illustrates Robert Moses' vision
for a city girdled by freeways. Red indicates existing freeways; green indicates freeways that were never
built.175
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With little public support for the highway, the state of Oregon under the provisions
of the 1973 Federal Aid Interstate Highway Act requested an exchange of Interstate
Highway funds for federal dollars that could be used on mass transit and road
improvement projects. The Mount Hood Freeway project was officially cancelled in 1975
and in 1976 the U.S. Department of Transportation agreed to exchange the approximately
$180 million, once targeted for the construction of the freeway, for a similar amount that
could be used on other transportation projects, including mass transit. The Mt. Hood
Freeway was then officially removed from the Interstate Highway System. Over the next
decade and a half, funds once designated to build the most controversial road in
Portland's history were used elsewhere in the Portland area, including for the city's
first MAX light-rail line.176 Due to this investment in public transport the number of
automobiles entering and leaving downtown Portland did not rise from 1987 to 1997.177
Another unique planning aspect of downtown Portland began in the 1930s when
the city had the rotting wharves and trash-strewn riverbank replaced with an interceptor
sewer and seawall. Harbor Drive, a bypass for downtown, was then built on the newly
filled in land.178 By 1950, Harbor Drive, which ran adjacent to downtown along the
western bank of the Willamette River, had become Portland's first limited-access
highway, carrying six lanes of traffic. Because of the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act
more freeways were built in the city during the 1960s. This included Interstate 5 on the
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eastern bank of the Willamette River and Interstate 405, a western bypass around
downtown, which made Harbor Drive less important as a long-haul freeway route.179
In January of 1967, newly elected Governor Tom McCall, a Republican, pledged
his support for the beautification of the west bank of the Willamette River. McCall
mentioned the City Beautiful plans at the turn of the century that had envisioned parks
and greenways along the river. Governor McCall even fought the Oregon State Highway
Department which proposed a Harbor Drive expansion. By 1968 Governor McCall called
for a study to evaluate the removal of Harbor Drive, envisioning a park along the
waterfront and a series of linked open spaces as part of the Willamette Greenway.
Completion of the I-405 freeway and the Fremont Bridge provided a replacement route
for Harbor Drive. In 1974 Harbor Drive was closed and replaced by Tom McCall
Waterfront Park.180
In 1972, Portland began to experience rapid growth and a high rise boom in the
downtown. Faced with a lack of green space, increased traffic congestion and
environmental neglect of the Willamette River, a Mayor’s Citizen’s Advisory Committee
was established to develop a new Portland Downtown Plan. Citizen goals focused on
recreation and open space and views, but did not stress public access to the river or
improvement of the river habitat. Based on the recommendations of the Downtown Plan,

"Portland's Harbor Drive." Congress for the New Urbanism. Accessed December 14, 2014.
http://www.cnu.org/highways/portland.
180
"Waterfront Park Master Plan." Accessed December 14, 2014.
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/parks/article/485891, p.15-17.
179

92

the city made a commitment to redevelopment and set up the Waterfront Urban Renewal
District. Portland would use tax increment financing to make large scale public
improvements that would include building Governor Tom McCall Waterfront Park.181
Successfully removing a highway and replacing it with useful green space did not
happen overnight. The first plan for the waterfront was produced in August 1975 by the
architecture firm Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca (WZGF) in Portland in conjunction with
Royston, Hanamoto, Beck and Abey of San Francisco. Implementation of the plan was
initiated by the Portland Development Commission (PDC) with tax-increment funds over
the next twelve years, from 1976–1988, in five phases. Construction began first along
Front Avenue and the Ankeny Plaza area. This was followed by four subsequent
redevelopment projects until the last section, north of the Burnside Bridge, was
completed in 1989. Development of the park as it is seen today occurred over seventeen
years in five phases at the cost of approximately $20 million dollars.182 The thirty-six acre
Waterfront Park opened in 1978. In1984 the park was renamed after former Governor
Tom McCall, who had passed away the year before.183
Portland and Indianapolis from the 1970s through the 1990s took on a number of
different projects that were able to create growth. Each city had dynamic leaders who saw
current problems as opportunities. The growth of these two cities were built on vastly
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different foundations. Portland, through the use of city and county commissions and
Urban Growth Boundary, was able to create sustainable growth. Investing Federal
highway funds into public transit helped to decrease auto pollution, traffic, and prevent a
dead zone of abandoned housing and factories.
Indianapolis, however, relied more on private and charitable contributions to
rebuild its downtown. Unigov created an unequal tax structure that has forced Center
Township residents to bear a heavier burden of the taxes needed to encourage growth
throughout the city. While many of the city’s improvements have been located in Center
Township, most of the jobs that have come with these improvements have been low
paying service industry jobs. This has also had the effect of disenfranchising Center
Township residents who are predominantly black.
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Chapter 2 Lack of Collaboration and Compromise
Center Township
The Indianapolis Public School system (IPS) has not been able to provide the
same opportunities as a suburban school since shortly after the graduations of notable
Indiana authors Kurt Vonnegut Jr. (1940), Dan Wakefield (1950), and Indiana statesman
Richard Lugar (1950) from Shortridge High School. The white flight to the suburbs has
hurt IPS in several way including the lack of leadership from the Indianapolis Public
Schools Board of School Commissioners, and citizens who do not vote in school board
elections or for referendums over the raising of taxes to support local schools. Unigov
and the center city tax abatements that have been used to revitalize downtown have also
hurt IPS funding and no additional funding has been appropriated from the city or the
state to make up for these tax abatements. These poor educational opportunities also
inhibit job growth in the area that IPS serves.
One of the most disappointing political realities of Unigov was the inability to
bring any better solution than eleven different school districts in Marion County. The
state of Indiana had failed to consolidate any Marion County school districts in 1959
when it passed the School Corporation Reorganization Act, commonly known as the
school consolidation bill.184 By 1959, the disparity in education between rural schools
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and urban schools was too large to ignore. By 1968 the consolidation bill had dropped the
number of public schools in Indiana from 939 to 382, and more than ninety percent of
Indiana students attended school in consolidated districts run by professional
administrators.185 With no public support, no one from the state government was willing
to enforce the law and consolidate any public school corporation in Marion County.
Indianapolis Public Schools have faced the most problems of any school
corporation since the 1950s when white flight began and Center Township residents
moved to the suburban townships and out of the pre-Unigov city. In 1968 the U.S.
Department of Justice filed a suit against the Indianapolis School Board, accusing them
of gerrymandering school districts to perpetuate segregation, failure to integrate Crispus
Attucks High School, and failure to integrate teaching staffs.186 The Unigov provision to
not consolidate schools would directly come into play during this case, and even though
the suit was filed before the passage of the Unigov bill, it would still have a direct effect
on how segregation in the Indianapolis Public Schools was to be solved.
Indianapolis Public Schools and Desegregation
The U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) had jurisdiction over Indianapolis Public
Schools (IPS) through the 1964 Civil Rights Law. In April of 1968 the DOJ made IPS
aware that they had received a complaint of racial discrimination and the subsequent DOJ
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investigation proved the complaint had merit. The investigation found that the school
system’s practices with respect to student and teacher assignments denied black students
in Indianapolis equal protection of laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.187 The
letter sent to IPS was meant to alert the school board to the DOJ findings and provide the
school system an opportunity to take the appropriate steps to eliminate voluntarily the
racially discriminatory practices that had been found in the operation of IPS.188 In 1968
the U.S. Justice Department filed a petition against the Indianapolis Public Schools,
claiming the city was operating a de jure segregated school system. This meant that the
school system was accused of explicitly making administrative decisions on the basis of
race that resulted in segregated schools, not merely failing to compensate for changes in
housing patterns or other circumstances that result in de facto segregation.189
The IPS response came from Mark Gray, school board member, who stated that
IPS would stand firm on the neighborhood school concept and that there was no hint of
segregation in assigning pupils or teachers. For good measure IPS also claimed that the
DOJ had no jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.190 Denying the charges and
jurisdiction of the DOJ while at the same time taking steps to further desegregation set
Indianapolis Public Schools on a doomed course that would demand large amounts of
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time from the school board and huge expenditures in legal fees from the school system.
Both hurt the quality of education that IPS was able to provide to its students.
Part of the reason that many felt IPS was not segregated and that Indiana was at
the forefront of desegregation was due to the Indiana Educational Desegregation Law of
1949. This law stated that it was the public policy of Indiana to provide public schools
“equally open to all and prohibited and denied to none because of race, creed, color, or
national origin”, and to “abolish, eliminate, and prohibit segregated and separate schools
or school districts on the basis of race, creed, or color.” This policy applied to public
kindergartens, common schools, public schools, colleges, and universities of the state.
The law further provided that there shall be no discrimination “in any way in hiring,
upgrading, tenure, or placements of any teacher on the basis of race, creed, or color.”
This law also provided a strict schedule schools were expected to adhere to in order to
complete the desegregation process in a timely manner.191 Superficial compliance soon
took hold.
IPS school officials stated that elementary school district lines be adhered to
firmly and declared this in policy statements as well. White children were still allowed to
transfer out of predominately black school districts and it was not required for the
principals to report these transfers to administrators. “The Negro high school enrolls
Negroes from optional school districts in which whites also have the privilege of
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attending either mixed high schools or the Negro high school.”192 This gave the local
illusion that voluntary desegregation was happening and that doing nothing was really
doing something. Even less was done by way of having black teachers teach white
students. Black teachers were still assigned to predominately black schools while white
teachers taught white and mixed schools.
Judge S. Hugh Dillin of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana was assigned to the case. The trial did not actually begin until July 12, 1971
and the case was heard without a jury. DOJ was aiming to prove that IPS was guilty of de
jure segregation as opposed to de facto segregation and this was mainly pertaining to the
elementary schools.193 Judge Dillin handed down his verdict in August of 1971 in which
he found IPS guilty of de jure segregation. He cited such examples as IPS moving
students from overcrowded schools but not moving them to the school in closest
proximity to their homes. Of the approximately 350 changes in school boundaries since
1954, more than 90 percent had the effect of increasing segregation.194
Dillin also noted various other factors such as the city’s segregated residential
practices due to realtor policies and restrictive covenants. Added to this was the policy of
only building public housing in Center Township.195 Judge Dillin also noted the
restrictions on IPS to annex land in the white suburbs. The annex restrictions had come
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from the Indiana General Assembly two weeks before the passage of the Unigov act,
which amended the 1961 law that stated that as Indianapolis expanded by annexation, the
Indianapolis city school expansion could be blocked if the township school system
objected.196 The amendment was to bar all future city school consolidation through
annexation.197 Unigov therefore kept IPS as it was while at the same time perpetuating
segregation by allowing the township schools, Beech Grove, and Speedway to accept
transfer students from IPS if the family of the individual student was able to pay
tuition.198
In Judge Dillin’s decision he brought up the effect of Unigov on the school
systems of Marion County: “Were the provisions excluding school corporations
unconstitutional as tending to cause segregation or to inhibit desegregation of IPS? If
true, did the adoption of Unigov automatically extend the boundaries of IPS to include
the entire Unigov area?” In order to answer these questions, Judge Dillin had the DOJ
add all concerned parties to the suit. The failure of the 1949 Indiana Educational
Desegregation Law in Marion County had become evident. Judge Dillin ordered IPS to
move students within IPS to make sure no more schools reached the tipping point of
having the black student population at forty percent or above.199 The DOJ found that once
the black population in a school reached forty percent it was next to impossible to

Ibid., 257.
Ibid., 260.
198
Ibid., 286.
199
Ibid., 289.
196
197

100

desegregate due to the acceleration of white flight that had begun to take place.200 Dillin’s
orders for this trial only affected those at schools near the tipping point; in order to
desegregate the predominately black schools of the inner city, suburban schools would
need to be brought into the process to fully desegregate IPS. The response to this ruling
was best stated by Emma Lou Thornbrough: “The public response to the court’s decision
was swift, highly emotional, and for the most part, ill-informed.”201
During the next School Board meeting in late August 1971, it was decided to file a
preliminary plan for compliance with Dillin’s orders for the coming year. At a second
meeting a few days later, the Board decided to instruct legal counsel to take all necessary
steps to appeal the decision against the school system. This set IPS on a course of
prolonged litigation that would consume energies and resources and create uncertainty
and instability in the school system for the next ten years.202 Judge Dillin’s order only
affected three percent of the total number of students in IPS and only one percent needed
to be bused.203 The Board action to appeal shows how personally the Board members
took the Judge’s decision and how adamantly they felt that IPS was not operating the
school system in de jure segregation. If they could have put their personal feelings aside,
it would have been obvious that more court hearings would not be able to fix hurt
feelings but would have a devastating effect on the quality of education IPS was able to
provide its students. After the next IPS School Board election, those voted into office
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decided to take political retribution by firing Superintendent Stanley Campbell, who had
agreed with Judge Dillin’s decision. This had the effect of making Campbell’s successor
more of a politician than an educator according to Wade Mann of the Indianapolis
News.204
In February of 1973, the three member Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously upheld the earlier ruling that IPS was guilty of de jure segregation. The
appeals court did send back to Judge Dillin the part of his decision dealing with the State
of Indiana maintaining segregation and whether the suburban school systems should be
included in the desegregation of IPS. The next trial took place in June of 1973 and lasted
into July. The central issue was to figure out a remedy for the de jure segregation IPS had
been found guilty of in 1971. The added defendants were the State of Indiana,
represented by Governor Otis Bowen, other state education officials, and twenty-two
school corporations.205 It took two weeks for Judge Dillin to reach his decision.
He found the State of Indiana, certain state officials, as well as IPS, guilty of
perpetuating de jure segregation and that a metropolitan plan must be the remedy to this
situation. Judge Dillin noted Article VII of the State Constitution, which gives the
Indiana General Assembly nearly unlimited power to regulate the school system and that
employees of school corporations should undertake their duties not as employees of local
units of self-government but as officers of the public school system.206 In Judge Dillin’s
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earlier decision, he cited the selection of sites for three high schools in Indianapolis as
evidence of de jure segregation by IPS. Now he found the State and Board of Education
and the Superintendent of Public Instruction had approved these actions, thereby
contributing to de jure segregation within IPS.207
The added school corporations were not guilty of de jure segregation in education,
but Judge Dillin found that desegregation could not be accomplished within the
boundaries of IPS in a way that would work for any significant amount of time.
Therefore, the Indiana General Assembly had the power and the duty to devise a
metropolitan plan for the desegregation of IPS. If the legislature failed to act, the court
would devise a plan. Since it was up to the General Assembly to come up with a plan for
IPS, the ruling on the constitutionality of Unigov was unnecessary at the moment. An
interim order was issued with the decision that called for the transportation of
approximately 5,000 black students from inner-city schools to eighteen surrounding
school corporations and reassignments in the city schools so all schools would have at
least a fifteen percent black student enrollment. IPS was to pay the cost of tuition and
transportation of its students to the other school corporations. He could not order students
from the suburbs into the inner city since IPS was the only school system found guilty of
segregation.208
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Governor Bowen declared that IPS would get no leadership from the State House
when he stated that “the state legislature was not the place to seek an answer to the school
desegregation problems of Indianapolis…Desegregation was a local, not a state
problem.” The president of the State Senate even voiced “resentment at the blame Judge
Dillin placed on the General Assembly for not having coped with the desegregation
problem.” Mayor Lugar in January of 1974 stated it was clear that the American people,
as a whole, were opposed to coercive transportation of students for racial balance in
public schools and the issue of forced busing for racial balance was an issue on which
both black and whites agreed. He promised as mayor to work to replace forced measures
with voluntary ones. William Hudnut was working his re-election campaign for the U.S.
House of Representatives during this time and according to the Indianapolis News was
visible in his opposition to busing much more so than his challenger, Andy Jacobs Jr.209
In August 1974, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Dillin’s decision that
Indiana State officials had by varying acts and omissions “promoted and inhibited
desegregation within IPS, so the state as the agency in charge under Indiana law with the
operation of the public school system, has an affirmative duty to assist the IPS School
Board in desegregating IPS within its boundaries.” The court did overrule Dillin on the
inclusion of school corporations from outside Marion County to use in his remedy.
However, on the question of schools within the boundaries of Unigov, the appellate court
remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the establishment of the
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Unigov boundaries without similar establishment of IPS boundaries warranted an
interdistrict remedy within Unigov.210
In 1974 the Indianapolis School Board was under court order from Judge Dillin to
prepare a plan for the desegregation of Indianapolis schools. The School Board in direct
defiance of the court order had a plan prepared but then did not approve it because “This
board is opposed to the metropolitan plan of desegregation for the reasons that it will be
disruptive to the community and violates Indiana law in that it requires the involuntary
busing of children across legitimate governmental lines and this board has no legal right
to order implementation thereof.”211 After the meeting school board member Fred
Ratcliff told a reporter that the board had complied with the court order and if Judge
Dillin, who was in the hospital at the time, wanted them to submit a plan, he would have
to issue another court order.
Noted law school professor Charles Kelso observed that if local boards came up
with workable plans, courts, including the Supreme Court, would probably uphold them.
But, “so long as the Indianapolis School Board’s position remains as translucent
opposition throughout the entire matter, the Supreme Court will be concerned about the
efficiency of any plan the School Board might devise to achieve integration.”212 It must
be noted that after the board’s non-action, Jessie Jacobs, the lone black board member,
wrote to Judge Dillin. While asking if she could submit her own desegregation plan, she
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stated “It seems to me that my fellow board members have always acted as if they had no
obligation to move forward as public officers sworn to uphold the law and carry that law
out until or unless they were finally commanded to do so someday in the future by at
least the United States Supreme Court.”213
Before the next trial Circuit Court Judge John L. Niblack, former Indiana
Legislator Dan Burton, State Senator Joan Gubbins, and State Representative Robert
Bales announced that they were forming a committee to impeach Judge Dillin. Judge
Niblack explained this was due to Dillin’s “unconstitutional, unlawful, and dictatorial
conduct.” Burton stated there were a number of impeachable offenses but the main reason
was that Dillin had removed elected officials from office and “tried to educate kids
himself.” When Judge Niblack was asked by reporters why the committee was not
seeking impeachment for the judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals who had
upheld Dillin’s decision, Niblack responded “Because I didn’t choose to,” but did add
that the appellate court was a “rotten court.”214
The decision to seek public impeachment hearings of Judge Dillin was considered
so out of line by the Board of Managers of the Indianapolis Bar Association that they
issued a public policy statement on the topic but did so without mentioning any names.
The policy statement read that the Bar Association of Indiana did not approve of
“personal attacks made upon judges and the resulting damage to our courts.” If a party
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believed a decision to be erroneous, “the remedy lies in the orderly process of appeal,
even to the Supreme Court of the United States, if need be, in efforts to reverse the
decision by lawful and proper means…Personal disparagement of a judge because he has
determined controlling law resulting in an unpopular decision in a given case, does
disservice to our community and fundamental institutions.”215
The next trial took place in March 1975, and Mayor Lugar testified, citing the
rejection of the 1959 Indiana School Consolidation Act in Marion County as the basis for
his reasoning that Unigov would not have been passed if schools were involved in the
plan for metropolitan government. Dillin gave his opinion on Unigov in August. He
stated, “When the General Assembly expressly eliminated the schools from consideration
under Unigov, it signaled its lack of concern with the whole problem and this inhibited
desegregation within IPS.” The General Assembly, representing the state as a whole,
should not have been “subservient to local pressures, and undoubtedly could have
legislated a county-wide school system for Marion County as easily as legislating a
county-wide civil government.”216
Dillin also stated that the evidence presented to the court showed the outer
townships and suburban governments, including the school corporations, “consistently
resisted the movement of black citizens or black pupils into their territory.” They resisted
annexation until it was clear schools would not be involved. He also noted other agencies,
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including the Indianapolis Housing Authority, had perpetuated residential segregation in
Marion County. He therefore ordered any new public housing from being built within the
boundaries of IPS and prohibited the renovation of Lockefield Gardens as a public
housing project.217
While Judge Dillin did have the best of intentions behind the housing order, it
ended up hurting those it was trying to help. This order lasted for multiple years and hurt
the ability of the city to develop housing for everyone downtown which was the area it
was trying to revitalize. This order increased the income disparity and racial segregation
that already existed in Marion County. The reasoning behind the order stemmed from the
problem that all housing projects in Indianapolis at this time were located in IPS
boundaries and that 98 percent of residents in public housing were black.218 Judge Dillin
also cited that since IPS’s student population was now forty-two percent black,
desegregation of the system was impossible unless a substantial number of black students
were transferred to outside school corporations. With the desegregation orders expected
to be in place for the 1975-1976 school year, recently elected Mayor Hudnut pledged his
full support behind Judge Dillin’s orders.219
In January of 1976 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on Judge Dillin’s
1975 decision. Justice Luther Swygert wrote the opinion. He found that in the Unigov
Act and the repeal of the law which provided for the extension of school boundaries
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when civil boundaries were extended indicated a legislative intent. The appeals court also
upheld Dillin’s order that the Indianapolis Housing Authority should build no new family
units in the IPS district. The court also indicated that Judge Dillin should retain
jurisdiction in the case, suggesting that the district court monitor the transfer of students
and to order any modifications if necessary. Four more years of litigation followed the
court’s decision with no significant changes being made.220
The instability of IPS placed undue hardships on its students, staff, and faculty due
to this drawn out litigation. In April of 1978 the IPS board approved the closing of seven
schools due to the loss of students to be bused to the townships schools. However, when a
stay was issued two weeks before school was to start in August, 300 school teachers were
hired back by IPS for another year.221 What had been lost in the shuffle of segregation
was the quality of education IPS provided to its students. According to noted Indianapolis
historian Emma Lou Thornbrough, IPS in 1980 had a high rate of dropouts, suspensions,
and expulsions among black students; problems were so bad that illiterate individuals
were still allowed to graduate.222
The final plans for desegregation involved the busing of 5,583 IPS students,
approximately five percent of IPS enrollment at this time, to six Marion County township
schools (Lawrence, Warren, Perry, Decatur, Franklin, and Wayne). The total number of
students assigned to each township was based on each township’s school population for
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grades one through nine with the intended goal of a fifteen percent black population for
each township. Students who were assigned to Lawrence, Warren, and Wayne townships
schools were chosen due to their close proximity. This was not plausible for Franklin,
Perry, and Decatur township schools. For these schools IPS looked at areas that had a
high concentration of black students and were also near an interstate. This would cut
down on bus stops and overall travel time for the students.223 In three years high schools
would be desegregated as each new incoming freshman class would already be set up that
way. Another 17,000 students were being bused within IPS and within a two year period
500 teachers were laid off and ten elementary schools were closed.224 By the 1987-1988
school year more than half of all IPS students would ride the bus to school.225
For the most part the desegregation of IPS went smoothly and without incident.
Problems that were encountered included a disparity in the treatment of black and white
students in disciplinary cases in the township schools. The Community Desegregation
Advisory Council noted that the disparity in discipline between white and black students
was so great that it was impossible to escape the recognition that some actions grew out
of racial insensitivity. The other major problem was the high number of cases of black
students being held back from promotion to the next grade.226 This was mostly attributed
to the fact that IPS pupils had not had the opportunity to attend kindergarten and the low
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quality of education that IPS provided the residents of the inner city. 1984 was the first
year all grades, one thru twelve, were desegregated in the IPS system.227
The cost of desegregation was ordered by Judge Dillin to be paid for by the State
of Indiana. From 1981 – 1985, IPS received more than $21 million from the state to
upgrade schools, introduce new programs, and to reduce class sizes by hiring more
teachers. When the state funding ended in 1985, IPS attempted to raise property taxes but
was defeated at the polls by a well-financed group called the Indiana Taxpayers
Association. This was not surprising since only twenty-seven percent of Center Township
residents at the time had children who attended public schools, but what was surprising
was that nearly eighty-five percent of eligible voters failed to vote.228 In 1987 the
Indianapolis Star reported that township schools had received bonus money ranging from
$1,238 to $2,134 per student over the actual cost to the township. The townships schools
were able to use this money for such things as new books in the library and higher
teaching salaries, which made it even harder for IPS to provide a quality education.229
Opposition by white voters from the outer townships of Marion County was
clearly the reason that school systems were not included in Unigov. For years the outer
township school corporations paid enormous fees to legal counsel in an attempt to avoid
accepting a modest number of black students from the inner city, a policy which has left a
legacy of resentment and suspicion in the black community of Indianapolis. Ironically,
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the township schools have benefited financially from desegregation and the transfer of
black students. In retrospect, the remedy created by Judge Dillin appears to have been
pragmatic and moderate but the prolonged opposition is difficult to understand. In June
1998 a settlement was reached between IPS, suburban township schools, and government
agencies approving an agreement that would phase out busing of inner city black students
to township schools by 2017.230
IPS Enrollment
IPS enrollment dropped from 100,000 in 1968, when the desegregation suit began,
to approximately 47,000 in 1993. As of 1993, IPS spent $4,993 per pupil annually and
had an overall budget of approximately $352 million.231 Overall, the busing added
distance between where families lived and where their children were to be educated, by
imposing additional rules and regulations upon administrators and teachers, and by
placing racial balance ahead of parental choice of (and commitment to) schools. They
unwittingly reduced educational opportunities for many students.232 The state and local
governments have been unable to provide the students of IPS the same education that is
provided to students throughout most of Indiana. This is largely due to the fact that IPS
received little for its own desegregation needs such as the bussing within IPS, further
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hurting its ability to keep up with technology needs and teacher pay, whereas the
suburban schools districts were able to use their increased funds from the desegregation
process to increase teacher pay as pointed out by James Adams in 1987 who was IPS
superintendent.233
Recent graduation rates suggest that IPS is still struggling to prepare students for
future success. Graduation rates for the 2012-13 school year were 68.3 percent, up from
65.4 percent the previous school year. Of the 68.3 percent to graduate, nearly nine
percent of those students needed a state waiver that exempts students from passing state
tests to earn diplomas. IPS has the lowest graduation rate of all Marion County schools.
Statewide graduation rates for both these school years was eighty-eight percent.234 IPS as
of the 2013-14 school year had 30,813 students with eighty-three percent of the student
body receiving free or reduced meals.235 IPS has had some bright spots with the use of
magnet schools; one of its seven high schools was recognized by U.S News in its annual
ranking of best high schools in the nation. Crispus Attucks, the medical magnet high
school for students interested in a career in the medical field and formerly all black high
school, was also ranked as the 34th best high school in the state.236 It must also be noted
that in 2001 Indiana passed a charter school law which allowed local school boards,
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public state universities, and the mayor of Indianapolis as eligible chartering
authorities.237 This has hurt funding to the local school districts by reducing enrollment
numbers. The performance of charter schools has been far from expected; as of 2014, half
of the state's 76 charter schools are doing poorly or failing.238
The poor quality of education being offered by IPS hinders Indianapolis’ ability to
attract jobs. In 1991, seven months after United Airlines (UAL) announcement that
Indianapolis had won the bid to bring a new billion-dollar facility to maintain its
expanding fleet of Boeing 737s, UAL officials revealed that the company was having
difficulty persuading its current employees to move to Indianapolis because of the poor
performance record of the city’s public schools. In comparing the finalists among the
cities competing for the maintenance hub, UAL had discovered that Indianapolis was
spending more money on elementary and secondary education but getting worse results
than other places. According to a UAL official, this had been the biggest weakness in the
city’s effort to obtain the project.239
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Portland Public Schools
The Portland Public Schools (PPS) experience with desegregation was far
different from what Indianapolis experienced. The black population of Portland only
comprised two percent of the total city population by 1957 but eighty percent of the black
population lived in the Albina district of Portland. This area is located in the northeastern
part of the city. School desegregation was a major issue for PPS in the 1960s and 1970s.
After the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision, PPS took the
position that "it had a policy of equal education and that it would take no action regarding
segregation in Portland Public Schools."240 However, after PPS sponsored a report to
assess racial isolation and racial disparities in academic achievement, this report would
be known as the Schwab Report. It took 18 months to complete and in 1964 concluded
that racial disparity in education did exist and made over forty recommendations.241
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Portland’s changing ethnicity from 1960-1990. 242

Recommendations from the Schwab report included keeping the neighborhood
school model, which did nothing to alleviate the problems caused by housing segregation,
and advised against busing. In order to alleviate the schools segregation problem the
Schwab Report recommended the voluntary Administrative Transfer Program (ATP),
which allowed students to transfer to other schools provided there was room but required
parents to bear the responsibility for transportation.243 The Schwab Report provided the
following reasons for opposing busing:
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We also fear the probable result of taking a small group of Negro children of
deplorable home background out of an Albina school and isolating it in an all-white
middle or upper class school where the Negro children may be two or three grade
levels behind their new peers, and where they will be regarded as strangers,
outsiders, subjected to ridicule and paternalism.244
Members of the committee that wrote the Schwab Report believed that home life,
education level, and social and cultural differences had the greatest impact on black
students' educational experience, but they still assumed that most black Americans fell
into the deprived category, citing socioeconomic factors as being more important than
race in their opposition to busing. By rejecting busing for socioeconomic and cultural
reasons, PPS avoided the issues of racial desegregation and busing entirely. The Portland
NAACP branch condemned the Schwab Report based on several factors, including the
emphasis on cultural deficiency and the failure to address desegregation.245
The Model Schools Program (MSP) was the major solution of the Schwab Report.
Ten schools were selected for this program and its purpose was to provide compensatory
education at the elementary level in order to improve academic achievement through
smaller class sizes, classroom aides, and pre-schools.246 It is difficult to assess the success
of the MSP because of the lack of a systematic and comprehensive evaluation process,
but what is evident is that during the five years of its implementation, stability in critical
areas was achieved. Academic achievement, for example, while not statistically
significant, was rising; teacher turnover was reduced dramatically; and there were clear
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indications that rates of disciplinary referrals and attendance problems dropped. 247 The
local black community however, was still upset with the quality of education being
provided by the predominately black schools in the MSP.
By 1968, of the 4,800 black elementary pupils, 3,500 (seventy-three percent) were
enrolled in nine of the ninety-four elementary schools and this pattern was repeated at the
high school level.248 The assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. on Thursday,
April 4, 1968 brought the issues of race to the forefront of PPS as Jefferson High School
was closed on April 5th and 8th due to student unrest, but was reopened Tuesday April 9th.
Racial tensions continued to grow and in 1969 there was a large riot on Union Avenue
(today's Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard) that lasted four days.249 In the aftermath of
the riot, Portland became more proactive in reducing the underlying causes of the riot.
Desegregation of the PPS became a main focus. In the summer of 1969, PPS hired
Superintendent Robert Blanchard, and he quickly changed the direction of PPS with
regard to desegregation through his plan, "Portland Schools for the Seventies."250
The Schools for the Seventies program had a number of steps all aimed at
desegregating the PPS. The school district was decentralized and reorganized into three
administrative and attendance districts with new boundaries that effectively split the
black population of Portland. This was partially done by creating a middle school system
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that would replace the previous kindergarten-through-eighth-grade configuration but
specifically did not create a middle school for the Albina area. Early Childhood
Education Centers (ECECs), however, would be established in the Albina area, which
would theoretically encourage white Americans to send their children into a
predominantly black neighborhood for schooling; busing was provided for children
attending ECECs.251
This plan also called for an amendment to the Administrative Transfer Program
(ATP); to include busing and recruitment of black students, the plan established a racial
quota of 25 percent for minority students in schools. The redrawing of school boundaries
was the easiest way for the school board to remain compliant with the Supreme Court's
decisions and it also placed the greatest burden on the black population of Portland. By
1975, approximately 22 percent (2,346) of Portland's total black student population was
bused, compared to the 484 white students who participated in the ATP that same year.252
Black students had difficulty adjusting to their new schools and teachers in the receiving
schools were inadequately prepared to deal with the new students. The parents of ATP
students were satisfied that busing was providing their children with a better education,
and all of the parents interviewed said they would keep their children in the program.253
Jefferson High School, located in Northeast Portland, served as the city’s black
high school and had a number of problems. Enrollment had steadily declined during the
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1960s and 1970s, and in 1974, 1977, and 1980, the student body dipped below 1,000 total
students. Converting Jefferson into an arts magnet school in 1974 had a marginal impact
on increasing white student enrollment. Enrollment increased by approximately five
hundred students in 1982 after two nearby schools were closed for low enrollment. The
school's negative reputation began to fade until a gang-related shooting on the school's
front steps in February 1988 once again painted it as a dangerous place, and enrollment
declined. In the three years following the shooting, Jefferson lost over 400 students.254
As of 2014, Jefferson High School was comprised of fifty percent black students
and a total minority enrollment of seventy-six percent. With fewer than thirty percent of
students in the surrounding area attending the school, enrollment dropped to 583
students.255 In 2014, PPS had more than 48,500 students in eighty-one schools and was
the largest school district in the Pacific Northwest.256 The district also had four high
schools recognized by U.S News in its annual ranking of best high schools in the
nation.257 Not all areas of Portland Public Schools are succeeding; as of 2014, PPS is only
graduating seventy percent of its students and forty-two percent of the student body is on
free or reduced lunch.258
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PPS since the 1970s has enjoyed a more stable and successful learning
environment compared to IPS. Portland has been able to graduate seventy percent of its
students while IPS has yet to reach that mark. The 1969 federal segregation case caused
instability within the Indianapolis Public School System and has hurt the quality of
education IPS was able to provide its students before a desegregation plan was finally
settled upon in 1981. The failures IPS have reflected poorly on the city and detracted
businesses from relocating to its service area.
Indianapolis Infant Mortality Rate
Indianapolis under Unigov also has a disappointing history of funding social
services. In the early 1970s the City-County Council passed the Patterson Amendment,
which stated that the local government need feel no obligation to pick up the shortfall if
federal monies coming into the city were scaled back or discontinued. This amendment
was aimed primarily at curtailing the funding of social service programs to alleviate
human need. The amendment characterizes a common mindset in Indianapolis that social
funds are bad. It was decisions like these that led Indianapolis to lead all major U.S. cities
in the 1980s in the infant mortality rate, according to statistics released by the Children’s
Defense Fund. This was measured by deaths before one year of age. The city was also
experiencing a widening gap between white and black infant mortality rates. In 1986 and
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1987 black infants born in Indianapolis were 2.5 times more likely to die before their first
birthday than white infants.259
Mayor Hudnut did provide great leadership when this announcement was made.
The city put together the Campaign for Healthy Babies, whose main goal was to reduce
the number of newborns with low birth weight. A baby born weighing less than 3.5
pounds is 200 times more likely to die than a larger baby. The biggest problem to
overcome for this campaign was citizen apathy. A City-County Council member even
said to Hudnut, “I don’t know why I should vote for any money for this campaign. It’s a
problem for the black people downtown, not where I live.” Hudnut was able to counter
this materialistic argument by the fact that it was in the economic self-interest of the
suburban constituency to help decrease the incidence of low birth-weight babies who
would have great difficulty surviving, because the fight to keep them alive cost more than
good prenatal care. Hudnut liked to say, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.” The average hospital cost of care for a very low birth-weight infant was
approximately $70,000 at the time.260
In order to solve the infant mortality problem more education and better access to
services was needed, but it also had to be paid for. Part of the funding came from the
Ford Motor Company and March of Dimes to purchase a Maternity Outreach Vehicle
that would travel to city neighborhoods providing information and health care. Four
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comprehensive medical teams began working in six service locations, and by 1991 these
teams served more than twenty percent of the highest-risk mothers in the city. These
efforts achieved mixed results. The statistics began decreasing faster than those in other
large cities, but they still remained too high for Mayor Hudnut. By the end of 1991
Indianapolis had dropped from first to eleventh in infant-mortality rates among all major
U.S. cities. The white infant mortality rate fell from 9.9 to 6.9 percent, while the black
rate increased from 18.9 to 20.7 percent. By October of 1993 the black rate had decreased
to 11.2 percent, but again that was incredibly high.261 While these numbers do show that
improvement was being made, it also shows how much work was still left to be done
when it came to helping the citizens of the inner city. Infant mortality rates recently
reported by the Indianapolis Star stated that Marion County had a high of 12.9 percent in
2009 and that year the black rate shot past 20 to 21.4 percent.262
Unigov Tax Structure
A major reason that social services and IPS have had to deal with so many more
challenges than other cities has to do with the city’s tax structure. The principal local tax
in Marion County is the property tax. Even though one set of property assessment rules
apply throughout the county, the 1992 notice of property tax rates in Marion County,
published by the county auditor and treasurer presented a 3,840 cell matrix of property
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tax rates for Unigov. These rates varied from a low of $7.92 per $100 assessed valuation
in parts of Washington Township to a high of $13.09 per $100 assessed valuation in part
of Center Township.263 The difference in taxing has to do with the philosophy of the city,
which has been to match the scale of taxation with the scale of benefits received by an
area. This has led to the proliferation of different tax rates and taxing units within the
county as each new program of the consolidated city is funded by a special taxing district.
With this philosophy, Center Township pays the highest property taxes because the
residents are forced to pay for all county and municipal services.264 It was argued when
Unigov was passed that consolidation would have a redistributive impact by making the
suburban property tax available for central services, but this has yet to happen.
Center Township is home to more than one-half of all tax-exempt or deferred
property in the county. In 1992 these tax incentives for economic development cost
Center Township $18 million. This abatement contributed to Center Township’s higher
property tax rate. For the residents of Center Township, it seems that the abatements
created employment and entertainment for suburban residents but was paid for by the
increase in non-abated properties in the rest of the Township.265 The number of taxing
units in Marion County has increased under Unigov to around one hundred different
units.266
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Indianapolis Area Population Changes

Population of Indianapolis, Marion County and the MSA from the U.S. Census.267

Many of the problems facing Center Township also have to do with white flight to
the suburban townships and the outlying counties. In 1970, Center Township had a
population of 273,598, but by 1990 it was down to 182,140, which is a loss of thirty-four
percent of the population in a twenty-year span. The greatest loss for Center Township
has been that of local leadership which was already seen in the schools but also in the
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local neighborhood associations. With the many problems facing Center Township, it has
made it next to impossible to attract families back from the suburban townships and
outlying counties. The historical precedence for this can be seen in the recent efforts to
revitalize the Renaissance Place neighborhood.
Renaissance Place development lies a half mile north of downtown, and takes on a
pitcher shape. The northern boundary is Interstate 65 and Central Avenue and continues
south to encompass Central Avenue where it splits into East Street and Fort Wayne
Avenue. East Street becomes the eastern boundary and that continues south until Walnut
Street. Walnut Street creates the southern boundary until it dead-ends at Alabama Street,
which creates part of the western boundary. Fort Wayne Avenue runs at an angle and
creates the pitcher shape for the Renaissance Place neighborhood.
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Renaissance Place

Renaissance Place neighborhood outlined.268

In 1959 all the housing in the neighborhood was leveled as part of a failed urban
renewal program. Three high-rise luxury apartment buildings were built, and fifteen more
had been planned but never materialized due to the high vacancy rate at the first three
buildings. The land would sit empty for two decades until nearby neighborhoods became
historic districts, which helped to raise the value of the land.
In 1981 a developer got permission to build thirty nearly identical two-story, four
unit buildings on the eleven-acre site.269 Each unit had an attached garage, driveway,
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lawn, privacy fence, and ranch-style design. The city sold the land to the developer for
$22,000, even though it was bought by the city for $62,500; neither valuation is even
close to the 1959 assessed value of $570,490.270 There was also a ten-year tax abatement
for property owners that added to the financial appeal of the units. The project was unable
to offer any subsidized public housing due to the 1975 federal court order by Judge Dillin
that prevented any more public housing being built in IPS.271 This greatly limited the
demographic appeal of the project.
Renaissance Place was able to draw a number of middle class suburbanites back to
the city but it was limited to couples with adult children, adults living alone, same sex
roommates, and other households without a nuclear family. Every unit was sold and the
residents added to the area’s buying power along with improving the physical appearance
of the area. Local tax revenue from the project would be limited for the first decade and
increased by as much as seventy-five percent after ten-year tax abatements ran out. It
should also be noted that thirty-eight percent of the Renaissance Place units were rented
out by their owners.272 Nearly all the households were void of dependent children and
attracted many single homeowners because these units were smaller than the neighboring
houses in the nearby historic neighborhoods. By spring of 1983 half of the units were
owned by absentee landlords and half of these units were vacant, which meant the
neighborhood had the possibility of experiencing a rapid turnover in residents. Long-term
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residential stability is considered to be a safeguard against neighborhood deterioration in
the downtown area.273
Renaissance Place was successful in turning an empty lot into a viable
neighborhood but was not a viable option to draw suburban residents with children back
to Center Township. As Aaron M. Renn, a leading urban analyst states, “suburbs today
not only have better schools and safer streets than the central city, they feature fully
professional fire departments, large park acreage, lavishly landscaped parkways
exceeding city standards, and even better snow removal.”274 These public services are
also able to be offered at a cheaper price than the city can provide because there is less of
an existing tax burden in suburban locations.
Another disappointing side effect of Unigov has been to turn the Marion County
Republican Party into a modern day political machine. Unigov raised the number of
registered voters who could participate in the election of mayor and city-county council
from 239,371 to 406,155, with 85,000 of these newcomers registered as Republicans and
80,000 more who voted Republican but had not voted in the 1968 Republican primary.
This changed Indianapolis; pre-Unigov had a history of close mayoral elections but
Indianapolis became dominated by the Republican Party in city-county elections for the
first twenty years after the passage of Unigov.275
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Voter turnout for the first two elections under Unigov brought an increase in voter
turnout. The 1975 election was Hudnut’s first; he received his greatest challenge from
Robert Welch, a local businessman. Welch’s mayoral loss signaled to the Democrats that
they could not win under the Unigov format. In the 1979 election Hudnut received nearly
the same number of votes as he did in 1975 but this time there were 60,000 fewer people
voting. No Democratic mayoral challenger in the next three elections against Hudnut was
able to received even seventy-five percent of the vote that Welch received in 1975.
Unigov has allowed the Republican Party to dominate Indianapolis government and has
diminished participation of Democratic voters who mainly come from the center city.276
Racial Consequences of Unigov
Black residents of Center Township have felt some of the most negative aspects of
Unigov. In 1960, blacks constituted twenty-seven percent (130,000 people) of
Indianapolis’ population and with white flight it was expected to be between thirty
percent and forty percent by 1970. With the passage of Unigov, the black presence in the
city fell to eighteen percent and black political strength reverted back to what it had been
in 1945. While Unigov has increased the number of black representatives on the CityCounty Council compared to the pre-Unigov system, this has not transferred into
increased influence as most blacks are Democrats in a system that routinely creates
Republican majorities.
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After Unigov, black residents only held a minority status inside a minority party
that was unable to win a mayoral race or a majority on the City-County Council for the
next twenty years.277 But the most telling legacy of Unigov on the black community is
that there were no black members involved in the planning of Unigov, nor were any black
politicians or community leaders needed to pass this piece of legislation. Instead of
helping to unite a community, Unigov has had the effect of creating an even larger gulf
between the black and white communities of Indianapolis.278
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Mayor Hudnut also continued the tradition of the RAC in allowing unelected
officials major access and input into the city plans of Indianapolis. The City Committee
was an unofficial, self-selected group that worked behind the scenes in the 1970s and
1980s to advance the city’s downtown plans. This committee has been widely
acknowledged but was never publicized and consisted of approximately thirty men with
only State Representative William A. Crawford being the only minority member. This
small group of young businessmen, lawyers, bankers, and civic leaders met privately to
discuss the city’s development plans. The committee appears to have disbanded
sometime before the 1991 election.280
The Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee also works in this same manner of
having non-elected officials helping craft government policies. The GIPC is a private,
not-for-profit, non-partisan civic improvement organization funded by foundation grants
and private contributions. It was created under Mayor Barton in 1964. It functions as an
advisory arm of the Mayor’s office and has its roots as an elitist organization. Mayor
Hudnut attempted to change this by inviting local leaders from neighborhoods, organized
labor, the League of Women Voters, and the Jaycees, but business and other professional
leaders were still more numerous. This has always given the GIPC a top-down view and
the organization has often been faulted for being an unelected “showdown government.”
It is an institution that has had tremendous influence on the city’s agenda but is
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accountable to neither the electorate nor their representatives on the City-County
Council.281
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Chapter 3 Outside Funding
Lilly Endowment
Indianapolis and Unigov have been extremely lucky to have had the support of the
Lilly Endowment. The Lilly Endowment was created in 1937 by three members of the
Lilly family (J.K. Lilly Sr. and his two sons, J.K., Jr. and Eli) through gifts of stock in
their pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly and Company. A change to the tax code in the
1969 Tax Reform Act forced the Endowment to diversify its stock holdings and to
increase its grant pay-outs. All foundations are required to pay out either five percent of
their assets or income, whichever is greater; due to this, the Endowment's giving rose
from about "$9 million in the late 1960s to over $50 million by the mid-1970s."282
In 1972 Eli Lilly, the endowment’s co-founder, began helping Indianapolis with
larger and much more concrete efforts than ever before. He personally met with Mayor
Lugar in 1972 to discuss the poor condition of downtown, and three days later Lilly told
Lugar that the endowment would renovate the City Market. A few months later a member
of Lugar’s staff, James T. Morris, was hired by the endowment to administer Indianapolis
projects.283
Between 1975 and 1987 the endowment invested $300 million in the city. It
became a major partner in public and private ventures to help rebuild the city. The Lilly
Endowment contributed $25 million to the Indiana Convention Center expansion that
282
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included the Hoosier Dome. It supported the restoration of the Central Canal, the Indiana
Theatre, and the Circle Theatre (located on Monument Circle and since the 1980s home
of the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra), and also made substantial grants to build the
new Indianapolis Zoo, the Eiteljorg Museum of the American Indian and Western Art,
the sports complex on the IUPUI campus, the Major Taylor Velodrome, and the Walker
Building. By 1991 Indianapolis and Indiana recipients had received more than $1 billion
from the endowment. In the early 1990s the Lilly Endowment refocused its attention on
human needs and more state-wide initiatives.284 The Lilly Endowment is unique to
Indianapolis and has greatly helped the economic development of the city.
Krannert Charitable Trust
Another charity that greatly helped the economic development of the city was the
Krannert Charitable Trust. It was established in 1960 by a million-dollar gift from
Herman and Ellnora Krannert of Indianapolis. The aim of the trust was to fund major
projects that would create “Centers of Excellence” in the fields of education, medicine,
youth services, and performing arts. The trust was also created in such a way that it was
to dissolve within 15 years after the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Krannert; he died in 1972 and
she died in 1974. The final grant was given in 1987, but during its twenty-seven years the
trust received $62 million from the Krannerts and paid out $200 million in grants. The
trust help fund a local YMCA, the Children’s Museum, the Hoosier Dome, the Pan
American Plaza, University Place Conference Center at IUPUI, and the Indiana
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Theatre.285 The Krannert Charitable Trust was an unexpected contribution in helping
revitalize Indianapolis.
Federal Funds
Perhaps the most unexpected change to come from Unigov was the ability of
Indianapolis to secure federal funding. In the seven years prior to consolidation,
Indianapolis had never received more than $7 million dollars from the federal
government in one year, and averaged under $4 million per year. In the first year after
consolidation, federal funding increased five-fold, doubled again in 1972, and topped
$100 million dollars every year from 1973 to1990, peaking at over $300 million in 1981.
Federal spending in Indianapolis became a substantial portion of the city’s revenue from
1972 through 1990, averaging more than 15 percent of the city’s budget. From 1978
through 1981, federal dollars supported more than twenty percent of the city’s total
expenditures. A big portion of the increased federal spending in Indianapolis came via the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which brought more than $500 million to
Indianapolis from 1974 to 1987. By 1990, federal expenditures leveled off at $50-$100
million annually.286
There are three main reasons why this amount of federal funding was unexpected.
First, the population of Indianapolis increased by including areas of Marion County.
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Second, Mayors Lugar and Hudnut explicitly lobbied for federal dollars over six
consecutive mayoral terms, in contrast to previous mayors. And lastly, Republican
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan supported the largest city in
the country governed by fellow Republicans. Due to Mayor Lugar’s close relationship
with President Nixon, Indianapolis gained special treatment and significant federal
investment in the early 1970s, serving as “an urban laboratory in which to test new
approaches to coping with the problems of cities.”287 None of these things could have
been planned for, but Indianapolis was in a unique situation to take advantage of these
fortuitous circumstances.
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Conclusion
Indianapolis under the rule of Unigov has turned out to be a new city built on old
problems. Continual expansion must be counteracted because this type of growth is
unsustainable. Portland has proven to be a leader in how a city can use planning to build a
sustainable center city. That in no way diminishes the accomplishments of Unigov but it
does recognize that more must be done. Unigov was something that had never been tried
before in Indiana politics and has provided Indianapolis with more resources to solve
many of the same problems it had in the 1950s and 1960s.
With the I-465 belt road around Indianapolis, suburban development away from
the inner city is taking place at greater distances than ever before. Portland has refused to
build a ring road because it would be counterproductive to its compact city model.
Instead of the nine townships of Marion County as the Metropolitan Statistical Area, now
it consists of Marion County and the eight surrounding counties. The provision in Unigov
that does not allow for it to extend past the borders of Marion County is no longer a
viable option. Indianapolis needs a regional government like the Metro government that
governs Portland. More sustainable city and state planning is needed to reduce the
incredible distance the metropolitan area now spans.
Since Unigov is unable to expand past the Marion County line, it is unable to
capture the growth of the suburbs as it did in 1970. These suburbs outside of Marion
County have also grown considerably since 1970 and now directly compete with
Indianapolis for jobs and economic growth. According to a 2013 “job sprawl” report by
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the Brookings Institute, Indianapolis had one of the largest increases in the past decade of
jobs moving farther away from downtown.288 The number of jobs located ten to thirtyfive miles from the central business district rose to forty percent in the metro area in
2010. In 2000 it had been thirty-three percent of jobs in the metro area; this was the
eighth largest increase among the one hundred largest metro areas in the United States.289
Mayors Lugar and Hudnut were very successful at building a downtown that
attracted middle-class society back for a number of reasons. After all the improvements
to the downtown, it has still been unable to attract traditional families from the
surrounding suburbs. Harrison Ullmann, a local Indianapolis journalist, points out that
Carmel and the rest of the Hamilton County suburbs are now competing with
Indianapolis for access to middle-class society. He even refers to a mid-1990s Unigov
study that showed more people were commuting from suburb to suburb than from suburb
to the city for work.290 Indianapolis is starting to become more isolated from middle-class
society. This can be overcome by focusing on the residents of Indianapolis and improving
their quality of life.
John L. Krauss, director of the Indiana University Public Policy Institute, noted
that restaurants, department stores, automobile service centers, and other businesses have
followed the growing populations in Hamilton and Hendricks counties and other areas
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bordering Indianapolis.291 This trend continues on; in 2010 Indianapolis was below
average in the share of jobs within three miles of downtown but had a greater than
average share of jobs in the middle ring, three to ten miles from the city center. The
report concluded that the recession slowed the shift of jobs from the business core from
2007 to 2010, in part due to the suburban-led housing market collapse.292
Indianapolis Metropolitan Statistical Area Map

The nine county metropolitan statistical area of Indianapolis. 293
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Hamilton County is the clear leader in suburban development. This can best be
seen in a recent 2014 article by John Tuohy of the Indianapolis Star that outlined the
largest mayoral salaries in the state. The towns of Carmel, Westfield, Noblesville, and
Fishers, which is in the process of incorporation, are all able to provide greater financial
support to their respective mayors than Indianapolis is to its own mayor, even though it is
the largest city in the state.294 Suburban sprawl is a major problem for the nation and the
Indianapolis metro area. Unigov has been unable to stop suburban sprawl from the outer
Marion County townships to the adjacent counties. Unigov was designed to manage the
city but now the metropolitan area needs leadership to emerge and start solving these
larger problems.
American geographer D.W. Meinig, demonstrates that this has been happening
going as far back as 1890, when an editor in the September issue of Scribner's Magazine
noted that cities are at the mercy of business. Any business needing labor can have its
choice nowadays from a long list of cities which will give it a site for a factory, pay the
expenses of moving, and also potentially give towards the construction of a new
building.295 The system of “economic incentives” (corporate welfare) wastes public
dollars, subsidizes shareholders, fosters unfair competition, and diverts policy makers
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from making long-term improvements in their communities such as schools, medical
care, cultural institutions, and general infrastructure.
Aaron M. Renn, a leading urban analyst, details how people are now doing this as
well. Suburbs are able to offer an updated city built with current market trends, and
without legacy expenditures from past boondoggles, political dynasties, deferred
infrastructure development, and fewer low income residents. Eventually, the area fills up
and the growth comes to a halt. All these positives end up working in reverse as a cycle
of decline emerges that will ultimately cause major problems in vast tracts of suburban
America that aren’t either wealthy communities or in markets that have tight restrictions
on new buildings. The old outer suburbs of Marion County are currently facing this
problem as they have fallen out of favor and become zones of suburban blight. With this
system, all the liabilities and costs are attached to a territory that allows for those who can
to move, continuing the cycle of unsustainable growth.296
With a capitalistic system like the one just described, planning becomes
imperative for the sustainable success of a city. The key example that Portland and the
state of Oregon have set is the need for a state’s largest city to work together with the
metropolitan and state government. Portland has been the showcase for the people of
Oregon to demonstrate that working together can do more than people working
individually. An active and involved citizenry is needed as well as leadership that is
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willing to compromise in order to promote sustainable growth for everyone to be able to
enjoy.
For Indianapolis to compete with Portland or even Carmel, there has to be better
pull factors to draw traditional families back to the city. If the city becomes a better place
to live and work, others will take notice. The biggest hindrance to creating sustainable
growth and attracting the traditional family back to the city is the unequal education
offered by the eleven public schools systems serving Indianapolis. By improving the
school system, it will improve race relations as many failing schools are located in
predominately black neighborhoods. It will also increase Indianapolis’ ability to attract
businesses back to the center city because these workers will have the skills that are
needed.
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